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ABSTRACT

MAKING DETAILED PREDICTIONS MAKES (SOME) PREDICTIONS WORSE
Theresa F. Kelly
Joseph P. Simmons

In this paper, we investigate whether making detailed predictions about an event makes
other predictions worse. Across 19 experiments, 10,895 participants, and 415,960
predictions about 724 professional sports games, we find that people who made detailed
predictions about sporting events (e.g., how many hits each baseball team would get)
made worse predictions about more general outcomes (e.g., which team would win). We
rule out that this effect is caused by inattention or fatigue, thinking too hard, or a
differential reliance on holistic information about the teams. Instead, we find that
thinking about game-relevant details before predicting winning teams causes people to
give less weight to predictive information, presumably because predicting details makes
information that is relatively useless for predicting the winning team more readily
accessible in memory and therefore incorporated into forecasts. Furthermore, we show
that this differential use of information can be used to predict what kinds of games will
and will not be susceptible to the negative effect of making detailed predictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Good decisions often depend on good predictions. For example, an investment
decision hinges on one’s forecast of the market, an admission decision hinges on one’s
forecast of an applicant’s success, and a consumer choice hinges on one’s forecast of a
product’s quality. Thus, understanding the factors that affect prediction quality can also
help people make better decisions.
In this paper, we will demonstrate that making detailed predictions about an event
can make other predictions about that event worse. For example, asking people to predict
how many hits each baseball team will get in an upcoming game (a detailed prediction)
before predicting which team will win the game (a more general prediction) can make
their winning team predictions worse. This suggests that, counter to lay beliefs, thinking
through as many details about an event as possible could do more harm than good.
Prior research on detailed predictions
The question of whether asking more detailed prediction questions makes predictions
worse was first investigated by Yoon, Suk, Goo, Lee, and Lee (2013). Specifically, they
investigated whether more detailed versions of prediction questions led to less accurate
predictions about general outcomes. For example, predicting the final score of a soccer
game is a more detailed version of predicting the winning team because it not only
requires forecasters to determine which team they think will win, but also requires them
to consider additional details (e.g., whether it will be a low- or high-scoring game, how
many runs the victor will win by, etc.). In their investigation, Yoon and colleagues (2013)
asked participants to predict the outcomes of soccer games by either simply indicating
whether they thought the home team would win, lose, or tie the game, or by entering the
1

exact final score of the game. 1 In three experiments (N = 65, N = 86, N = 100
participants; n = 16, n = 18, n = 16 games), they found that winning team predictions
were less accurate when participants predicted the final score than when they simply
indicated a win, loss, or tie for the home team (p = .019, p = .037, p = .045). That is,
giving a more detailed version of the winning team prediction (i.e., the score) worsened
winning team prediction accuracy.
Yoon and colleagues claimed that this effect occurred because predicting scores is
more difficult and therefore makes people think too hard about which team will win, and
that thinking harder about their predictions made their predictions worse (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Dijksterhuis, Bos, van der Leij, & van
Baaren, 2009). However, as we will explain in more detail later, problems with their
design coupled with the fact that their samples were too small to reliably detect
differences in prediction accuracy means that whether and how detailed predictions affect
predictions about more general outcomes are open questions. We propose that making
detailed predictions makes forecasts of more general outcomes worse because doing so
brings to mind additional information that is not useful for predicting which team will
win the game. Furthermore, forecasters use this relatively useless information in their
predictions, meaning that they necessarily give less weight to more important information.
For example, asking people to predict how many hits each baseball team will get might
lead them to think about the quality of each teams’ pitchers and batters, and so when they
are subsequently asked to predict the winning team, information about pitchers and
batters is top-of-mind and therefore used in their forecasts. Importantly, while this
1

Yoon et al. (2013) refer to score predictions as “specific” predictions rather than “detailed” predictions.
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information might be diagnostic in isolation, it would provide little or no diagnostic
information over and above the information already contained within the teams’ win/loss
records given that the quality of the teams’ players directly affects how many games they
win. 2 Therefore, we propose that detailed predictions can make predictions about other
outcomes worse by causing forecasters to think about and use relatively useless
information in their predictions, taking focus away from more predictively valid
information (e.g., the teams’ win/loss records).
This hypothesis stems from three well-established findings from the psychology of
forecasting. First, people do not (and often cannot) consider all of the relevant
information when making predictions. Second, the information that people do consider
tends to be the information that is most accessible in memory, even if this information is
not the most predictively valid information available. Finally, forecasters are largely
unable to accurately weigh each piece of information according to its predictive value,
meaning that they tend to give too much weight to less useful information and too little
weight to more useful information in forecasts. Together, these three tendencies suggest
that drawing people’s attention to less important details about an event should make
predictions about more general outcomes worse. Importantly, in this account people are
not thinking more or less hard about their predictions. Rather, they are simply thinking
about different information and using that information suboptimally.

2

It should also be noted that people often overestimate the value of redundant information for forecasting
and thus give redundant information too much weight in their predictions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973;
Slovic, 1966; Soll, 1999).
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Forecasters only consider a subset of relevant information
When trying to predict the outcome of a future event, people are naturally inclined to
imagine ways in which that event might unfold. For example, people trying to predict
how much they would enjoy going on a camping trip with friends might first imagine
what activities they would do on the trip, what the weather would be like, how well
everyone would get along, etc. Furthermore, people use how easy it is to imagine
scenarios leading to a certain outcome (e.g., enjoying the trip) to estimate how likely that
outcome is to occur, and so people rely heavily on the scenarios that they happen to
imagine to make predictions about the future (Kahneman & Tversky 1981; Tversky &
Kahneman 1973). However, people tend to only consider a handful of possible scenarios,
and potentially important but unimagined scenarios are not incorporated into forecasts,
leading to poor and inconsistent predictions (for reviews, see Dunning, 2007; Kahneman
& Lovallo, 1993; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Thus, this
scenario-based method of forecasting is vulnerable to a variety of errors stemming from
the forecaster’s inability to exhaustively consider all of the relevant information for the
prediction.
One example of such an error is focusing too narrowly on the target event and failing
to consider other factors that, while not directly related to the event, would significantly
affect outcomes. For example, when trying to predict how long it will take to complete a
shopping trip, people are likely to build scenarios around things that are directly related
to “getting shopping done” such as driving to the store, looking for products, waiting in
line at checkout, etc., but are unlikely to consider other intervening factors that would
also affect how long it takes them to shop, such as getting stuck in traffic or coming down
4

with a cold (Dunning, 2007). Similarly, past research has found that when people try to
predict how much an event will affect their future well-being, they focus too heavily on
the direct impact of the event itself but fail to consider that other events in their lives will
also contribute to their overall well-being (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson &
Gilbert, 2005; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2000). For example, Wilson and
colleagues (2000) found that college football fans overestimated how long their
emotional well-being would be affected by their football team winning or losing a game
because they largely did not consider how other future events would also affect their
happiness (e.g., studying for exams, going to parties).
Forecasters also have difficulty considering information that is either abstract or not
explicitly presented to them at the time of the prediction. For example, when estimating
the likelihood that a complex system such as a car will fail, one strategy is to construct a
“fault tree” by listing all the things that could go wrong, such as “dead battery” or
“defective fuel system” (concrete causes), and adding a category for “all other problems”
(abstract causes). Then, the forecaster estimates the probability of failure for each
category to determine the total probability of failure for the entire system. However,
Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein (1978) found that people did not appropriately transfer
probabilities to the “all other problems” category when some of the concrete causes for
failure were omitted from the fault tree. To illustrate with a simplified example, if
comparing a tree that consists of “dead battery”, “defective fuel system”, and “all other
problems” to a pruned tree consisting of only “dead battery” and “all other problems”, the
probability given to “all other problems” in the pruned tree would be considerably lower
than the sum of the probabilities given to “defective fuel system” and “all other problems”
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in the full tree. In fact, the participants in Fischhoff et al.’s (1978) experiments were
largely insensitive to what information was missing from fault trees and therefore
significantly underestimated the probability of a system failure in trees that listed fewer
concrete sources of failure. Fischhoff and colleagues (1978) concluded that scenarios that
are not explicitly presented to forecasters are “out of sight, out of mind”, and are not
incorporated into forecasts. Importantly, even though people were able to improve their
predictions by generating their own list of concrete causes belonging to the “all other
problems” category (Dube-Rioux & Russo, 1988), they did not appear to do so unless
explicitly prompted.
Additionally, one of the most common omissions from forecasters’ predictions about
the future is information about what has happened in similar situations in the past
(Dunning, 2007; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Lovallo &
Kahneman, 2003). For example, imagine someone wants to predict how long it will take
her to complete a work project. Rather than considering all of the factors that might
influence how the project would progress (e.g., what resources she has at her disposal, the
availability of her teammates, what other tasks will be competing for her attention, etc.),
she could instead base her prediction on how long it has taken her to complete similar
projects in the past. Buehler and Griffin (2003), however, found that when people
predicted how long it would take them to complete tasks such as Christmas shopping or
class assignments, they mostly reported thinking about what they expected to happen in
the future and rarely reported thinking about how long it took them to complete similar
tasks in the past (see also Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994). Furthermore, participants who
were asked to think about their future plans made significantly less accurate predictions
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than those who were not. In fact, in many if not most cases, thinking about the outcomes
of similar past events generates superior predictions than imagining what might happen in
the future (Dawes, 1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Lovallo &
Kahneman, 2003; Meehl, 1954). This is partially because the kinds of information that
forecasters frequently fail to consider usually has similar effects on the likelihood of
certain outcomes occurring in the future as they did on those outcomes occurring in the
past. However, information about past cases is rarely used as the basis for forecasts
(Dawes, 1996; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004).
Forecasters use the information that is most accessible in memory
Given that people only consider a subset of the information available to them when
making predictions, it is important to understand the factors that influence what
information they think about. As mentioned in the previous section, the easier it is to
imagine scenarios leading to a certain outcome, the greater the perceived likelihood is
that the outcome will occur. This means that predictions are primarily influenced by the
information that comes most easily to mind, and so the outcomes or scenarios that are
most available (or “accessible”) in memory get incorporated into forecasts.
Indeed, research on this availability heuristic has frequently demonstrated that
incidents that come to mind easily are judged to be more likely (Morewedge & Todorov,
2012; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). There are
multiple factors that contribute to what information becomes readily available in memory.
The most straightforward reason is that some cue is frequently observed in conjunction
with a particular outcome, and over time, people learn the association between the cue
and the outcome (i.e., the cue is “ecologically valid”; Bruswick & Kamiya, 1953). For
7

example, people who see dark clouds outside will predict a high chance of rain because
they have observed throughout their lives that dark clouds are usually followed by rain.
In such cases, these cues (e.g., dark clouds) are highly available because they are truly
correlated with outcomes (e.g., rain).
However, there are other factors that affect the availability of information in memory
that are not related to how likely different outcomes are, such as how vividly and how
recently an event was observed. For example, the judged likelihood of being in a car
accident goes up immediately after seeing an overturned car on the side of the road, and
people believe that shark attacks and plane crashes are more likely than they actually are
because these events are featured prominently in the news (Plous, 1993; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973). Similarly, people erroneously estimate that there are more words that
begin with the letter “r” than words that have “r” as the third letter because it is easier to
generate instances of the former case (e.g., red, rabbit, radio) than the latter (e.g., card,
three, perfume; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In another illustration of the use of nonpredictive but highly available information, Morewedge and Todorov (2012) found that
people over-weighted atypical past behaviors in predictions about future behaviors
because atypical behaviors are more memorable, and Bastardi and Shafir (1998) found
that choosing to wait for information (e.g., waiting to find out the exact amount of debt a
mortgage applicant has) made this information more cognitively available and increased
its weight in judgments. Together, these findings mean that the most available
information is not always the most important information, but even so it is still likely to
be used in forecasts. Thus, increasing the availability of relatively unimportant
information should make predictions worse.
8

Also, because recently formed judgments are more available in memory, judgments
that people make earlier can have a downstream influence on subsequent judgments. For
example, in Feldman and Lynch’s (1988) accessibility-diagnosticity framework, answers
to previous questions are often used to approximate the answers to subsequent similar
questions in surveys (e.g., I might not immediately know how much I value animal
welfare, but I just told someone that I love dogs, so I am probably willing to donate $10
to the Animal Welfare Society). This is because preferences and beliefs are constructed
on the spot unless a pre-existing preference or belief is accessible in memory and
sufficiently diagnostic for the question at hand, in which case the pre-existing cognition
will be used instead. In fact, past research has identified several cases and conditions in
which answers to prior questions are used to approximate answers to subsequent
questions (Lynch, Marmorstein, and Weigold 1988; Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Menon,
Raghubir, & Schwarz, 1995; Simmons, Bickart, and Lynch, 1993). Also, as with the
literature on the availability heuristic, Feldman and Lynch (1988) identify that other
determinants of the accessibility of information in memory include how recently it was
activated, how vivid it is, cues from the environment (e.g., priming), etc. This means that
not only will recent judgments be highly accessible, but the information that was used to
make them will also be more accessible as well. These findings suggest that when
forecasters make predictions that are similar to other recent predictions, their previous
predictions and the information they considered when making them will be highly
accessible in memory and therefore likely to be used in their subsequent forecasts.
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Forecasters do not weigh information properly
So far we have discussed how forecasters only use a subset of available information,
and how the information they use is heavily influenced by what is most accessible in
memory. Another important component of forecasting, however, is how people use the
information they think about. Even if people were capable of considering all of the
relevant information about a prediction, they would still have a hard time weighing that
information properly. A wealth of past research has found that, in both judgments and
predictions, people tend to assign suboptimal weights to the information they consider.
For example, research on the dilution effect shows that giving people information that
provides little or no additional predictive power generally makes their predictions worse
(Edgell et al., 1996; Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Troutman & Shanteau, 1977;
Zukier, 1982). For example, Nisbett and colleagues (1981) had graduate students in
social work rate the likelihood that a hypothetical client was a child abuser based on
information that was judged by other social work students to be diagnostic (e.g., “he was
abused by his stepfather”) and information that was judged to be nondiagnostic (e.g., “he
manages a hardware store”). They found that, holding the amount of diagnostic
information constant, increasing the amount of nondiagnostic information about the client
decreased his judged likelihood of being an abuser. Indeed, this detrimental effect of
adding nondiagnostic information to predictions has been found across a wide variety of
domains, including accounting (Hackenbrack, 1992; Hoffman & Patton, 1997; Shelton,
1999), legal decisions (Smith, Stasson, & Hawkes, 1998), and consumer choice (Meyvis
& Janiszewski, 2002).
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One explanation given to why adding nondiagnostic information makes predictions
worse is that doing so makes the target seem more or less representative of various
outcomes (Lichtenstein, Earl, & Slovic, 1975; Nisbett et al., 1981; but see also Tetlock,
Lerner, & Boettger, 1996). The representativeness heuristic proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman is a mental shortcut whereby people base their judgments and predictions on
how similar (i.e., representative) a situation is to a particular outcome, or how similar a
target is to a particular category (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Kahneman & Tversky,
1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, people
judge the likelihood that a man named Tom is an engineer versus a lawyer based on how
well characteristics about Tom (e.g., that he likes mathematical puzzles) are
representative of a stereotypical engineer versus a stereotypical lawyer (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973). In many cases, judgments of representativeness override more objective
information about the distribution of outcomes in the population (e.g., Tom was selected
from a population that contains 70% lawyers).
However, past research has demonstrated that adding nondiagnostic information
makes predictions worse even in cases where judgments of representativeness are
unaffected or irrelevant (Dana, Dawes, & Peterson, 2013; LaBella & Koehler, 2004;
Nelson, Bloomfield, Hales, and Libby, 2001; Simmons & Lynch, 1991; Tetlock &
Boettger, 1989). This is because, in general, people are bad at weighing different pieces
of information relative to their predictive strength (Buehler et al., 1994; Griffin &
Tversky, 1992; Grove et al., 2000; Helzer & Dunning, 2012; Hutchinson & Alba, 1991;
Slovic, 1975; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Soll, 1999; Weaver, Garcia, & Schwarz,
2012; Yaniv, 2004), and give too much weight to information that has relatively low
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predictive power and too little weight to information that has relatively high predictive
power. For example, Hall, Ariss, and Todorov (2007) found that participants who were
only given the win/loss records and half-time scores of basketball games were better at
predicting winning teams than participants who were additionally given the names of the
teams. This was because, while the teams’ identities (and therefore their reputations) did
have some predictive power in isolation, they did not provide any predictive power over
and above the information that was already available (the win/loss records and half time
scores). However, participants did not seem to realize this and gave the team names too
much weight in their predictions. Similarly, people are largely unable to discount the
weight given to information that is largely redundant with existing information (Slovic,
1966; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Soll, 1999), and people also often give more weight
to the strength of evidence (e.g., how positive a letter of recommendation is) than to the
validity of evidence for predicting outcomes (e.g., how accurately recommendation
letters predict future performance) (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Nelson et al., 2001). Given
that forecasters are bad at properly integrating and weighing information when making
predictions, it stands to reason that drawing forecasters’ attention to less important details
about the outcomes they are trying to predict would make their predictions worse.
The present research: How do detailed predictions affect prediction quality?
While much research has shown that giving people non-diagnostic information
worsens their predictions, our investigation focuses on how prediction quality might be
affected by the way predictions are elicited. Specifically, we investigate whether asking
people to make detailed predictions affects the quality of their predictions about other
outcomes.
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Although Yoon and colleague’s (2013) finding that people who predicted final scores
made less accurate winning team predictions than people who only selected winners
seems to provide preliminary evidence that making detailed predictions can make other
predictions worse, this evidence is limited. First, whereas participants in the “Winner”
(non-detailed) condition were incentivized for correctly predicting the winning team,
those in the “Score” (detailed) condition were incentivized for correctly predicting the
exact final score. It is possible that participants in the Score condition were less
motivated to think carefully about their predictions since predicting exact final scores is
much harder (and therefore much less likely to pay off) than predicting winning teams.
Second, because participants in the Score condition gave their predictions using a more
complicated entry method (typing in each team’s score) it is possible that they simply
made more mistakes than those in the Winner condition. Finally, another potential
problem with Yoon et al.’s design is their definition of prediction quality. In their studies,
they assessed the quality of predictions by comparing the accuracy of predictions across
conditions. However, accuracy in sports predictions is a very unreliable, and thus poor,
measure of prediction quality; moreover, as we will later show, detecting differences in
prediction accuracy would likely require hundreds of games and thousands of participants
rather than the tens of games and participants recruited by Yoon and colleagues. Taken
together, it is unclear whether Yoon et al.’s (2013) result would replicate using a better
measure of prediction quality, and if so, whether it would emerge when the conditions
have the same incentives and the same chance of making mistakes. This means that
whether and how detailed predictions makes predictions about more general outcomes
worse are open questions.
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A few observations from past research on the psychology of forecasting suggests that
making detailed predictions would have a detrimental effect on subsequent related
predictions. First, people only consider a subset of relevant information when making
predictions, and the information they think about depends on how available/accessible it
is in their minds. This suggests that information considered when making detailed
predictions will also be considered when making other similar predictions (so long as that
information seems sufficiently relevant). For example, if people are first asked to predict
how many hits each baseball team will get, they are likely to continue thinking about
information related to how many hits each team will get when predicting which team will
win the game.
Additionally, people do not weigh the information they think about properly, and tend
to give too much weight to information that is relatively unimportant and therefore too
little weight to information that is more important. This suggests that considering
information that relatively unimportant for making the more general prediction will take
weight away from more important information and make predictions worse.
To investigate the question of whether making detailed predictions actually makes
predictions worse, we report the results of 19 experiments examining 415,960 predictions
from 10,895 participants about the outcomes of 724 professional sporting events and find
that making detailed predictions (e.g., the exact final score) does generally make winning
team predictions worse as our theory suggests. Next, we will explore possible alternative
explanations of this effect. We will show that detailed predictions do not worsen
predictions by increasing inattention or fatigue, thinking too hard, or decreasing selfreported consideration of the teams’ overall competencies. Instead, we will show that
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thinking about game-relevant details before predicting the winning team causes people to
give less weight to important diagnostic information, presumably because the detailed
information becomes more accessible in memory. Finally, we demonstrate that the
dilution of more useful information means that not all games will show this effect, and
that knowing how people use the information available to them allows us to predict what
kinds of events will and will not be affected by detailed predictions.

GENERAL METHODS
In 19 experiments, we randomly assigned participants to make detailed or nondetailed predictions about upcoming sporting events and then examined whether people
who made detailed predictions made worse predictions. Professional sports is a uniquely
useful context for studying predictions because sporting events occur frequently, have a
limited number of possible outcomes (win/lose/tie), yield timely and unambiguous results,
and are easy to incentivize. It is also easy to find a large sample of participants who have
some knowledge about the prediction context and are interested and motivated to predict
the outcomes (i.e., sports fans).
In total, we collected 415,960 predictions about 724 sporting events. Ten experiments
investigated predictions of Major League Baseball (MLB) games, five investigated
predictions of National Hockey League (NHL) games, three investigated predictions of
National Basketball Association (NBA) games, and one investigated predictions of
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup matches.
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Sample
Across 19 experiments, we recruited 10,896 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk website for an average of 573 participants per experiment and 191 participants per
experimental condition. 3 Most participants were male (71.7%) and the sample’s average
age was 32 years old (SD = 10.0). 4 Each study was advertised as a “survey for [sport]
fans” because we wanted participants to have some knowledge about the sport they were
predicting; however, they were not required to prove any knowledge about the sport to
participate. Participants were paid 50 to 75 cents for completing each 10-20 minute
survey and they earned an additional 5 cents for each correct winning team prediction
(the few exceptions to this incentive scheme are described below). The average
participant earned $1.72 (SD = $0.61) in total.
Procedure
All experiments had similar procedures. 5 In each study, participants were asked to
predict the outcomes of 29-48 upcoming sports games (M = 38 games per study, SD =
6.7). We sought to have participants predict as many games as possible without making
the survey too long and without asking them to predict games that were too far in the
future, and so the number of games varied by the sport asked about in the experiment. For
example, while there are about fifteen Major League Baseball games per day during the
regular baseball season, the number of National Basketball Association and National
3

We did not screen out participants who had participated in previous prediction studies because each new
study required predictions about novel games, and we did not believe that participants needed to be blind to
different conditions for the effect to occur. Furthermore, carryover effects between studies would lower the
likelihood of finding significant differences between prediction conditions. Across our sample, 57.2% of
participants had not previously participated in a prediction experiment.
4
The age calculations exclude five participants who reported ages less than 18 and seven who reported
ages greater than 100.
5
The complete survey designs for each experiment are reported in Appendix A1.
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Hockey League games per day varies considerably (typically between two and twelve
games per day). As a consequence, experiments that asked about baseball games had
participants predict 39-45 games (three days’ worth) while experiments that asked about
basketball or hockey games had participants predict 29-32 games (four days’ worth).
Participants made their predictions all at once 0-3 days before the games, with the
exception of the 48 FIFA World Cup Group Stage predictions in Experiment 12, which
were made 1-15 days before the games.
We manipulated how we elicited participants’ predictions. In all experiments, we
randomly assigned participants to make their predictions by either selecting the winning
team for each game (the “Winner” condition) or by entering the final score for each
game—a more detailed version of the winning team prediction (the “Score Only” or
“Score + Winner” conditions). 6 Experiments 1-3 included a Score Only condition in
which participants predicted each game’s final score without separately selecting the
winning team. In this condition, we inferred participants’ winner predictions from their
score predictions, as was done by Yoon and colleagues (2013). However, comparing
winning team predictions between “Winner” and “Score Only” conditions is problematic
because the mechanics of entering scores versus simply selecting winners could produce
artifactual differences between conditions. For example, condition differences could
emerge if participants are more likely to make errors when entering scores than when
selecting winning teams. To remedy this, Experiments 2-19 included a “Score + Winner”
6

Because Major League Baseball games, National Basketball Association games, and National Hockey
League games cannot end in a draw, we did not allow participants to enter tied scores or select a tied game
for these games (676 out of 724 in our sample). Because soccer games can end in a draw, we allowed
participants to enter tied scores and select “Draw” for the 48 FIFA soccer games in our sample (Experiment
12).
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condition in which participants both entered their predicted final score for a game and
then separately selected their predicted winning team. 7 This allowed us to make an
apples-to-apples comparison between the Winner condition’s winner predictions and the
Score + Winner condition’s winner predictions. Figure 1 shows examples of the Winner
and Score + Winner conditions.

7

In every experiment except one (Experiment 2), participants in the Score + Winner condition predicted
the score before predicting the game’s winner. In Experiment 2, they predicted the score after predicting
the game’s winner.

18

Figure 1. Example of the Winner and Score + Winner conditions (Experiment 4).

All predictions were incentivized. Experiments 1-3 followed Yoon et al.’s (2013)
incentive scheme of paying a smaller amount (5 cents) for each correct winning team
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prediction and a larger amount (40 cents) for each correct final score prediction. 8 In
Experiment 3, we manipulated whether participants in the Score + Winner condition
earned 5 cents for each correct winning team prediction or 40 cents for each correct final
score prediction. Note that incentivizing different outcomes (exact final scores vs.
winning teams) using different amounts (5 vs. 40 cents) across different conditions
introduces potential confounds when comparing the quality of winning team predictions
between conditions. For this reason, Experiments 4-19 held incentives constant across all
conditions (5 cents for each correct winning team prediction, with the exception of three
experiments described subsequently, in which the incentives were larger for half of the
games). In these studies, we paid all participants in all conditions for correctly predicting
the winning teams; they were never incentivized for accurately predicting any additional
details (e.g., scores, hits, etc.).
As previously mentioned, the 19 experiments investigated different sports: baseball,
basketball, hockey, and soccer. But they also differed in more meaningful ways. Most
importantly, although all experiments included Winner and Score conditions, many
experiments also included conditions in which participants predicted other details about
the game in addition to predicting the winning team. We included these other conditions
because we were interested in whether making any detailed predictions about the game
would make winning team predictions worse. In some conditions, these detailed
predictions were relevant to the game; for example, in three of the baseball experiments
(Experiments 4, 8, and 10), participants in the Hits + Winner condition predicted both the

8

Our payment amounts differed slightly from Yoon et al.’s, who paid 10 cents for each correct winning
team prediction and 40 cents for each correct final score prediction.
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number of hits each baseball team would accumulate and which team would win the
game. In other conditions, the predicted details were irrelevant to the game; for example,
in one of the hockey experiments (Experiment 16), participants in the Crowd + Winner
condition predicted what percentage of the crowd at the game would be American
citizens as well as the winning team. Our theory suggests that making any detailed
predictions that are relevant to the game should make winning team predictions worse to
the extent that they prompt forecasters to think about less useful information that gets
incorporated into their subsequent winning team predictions. All detailed predictions
were classified as either “relevant” or “irrelevant” a priori, and the conditions and
predictions in each experiment are described in greater detail in the Results section and in
the note to Table 1.
Experiments also varied in the information given to participants about each game. For
all games, participants were told the date, start time, location, the visiting and home
teams, 9 and, in the baseball experiments, the names of the starting pitchers. 10 In addition,
although most experiments also gave participants each team’s win/loss records (i.e., the
numbers of games won and lost so far that season), Experiments 6 and 12 did not give

9

Because Experiment 12 investigated FIFA World Cup matches that all took place in Brazil, only one team
(Brazil’s national team) out of 32 could be considered the “home” team. Thus, in this experiment, neither
team was designated as “home” or “visiting”.
10
We also ran 8 additional experiments in which we gave participants each team’s “Points Scored” (the
total number of points scored by that team so far that season) and “Points Allowed" (the total number of
points scored against that team so far that season) for football and hockey games, and each team’s
“Average Points Scored” (the average number of points scored by that team per game so far that season)
and “Average Points Allowed" (the average number of points scored against that team per game so far that
season) for basketball games. However, we chose not to include these experiments in our analyses because
we are worried that differences between prediction conditions in these studies (namely, between Winner
and Score + Winner) may have arisen because people who are asked about winners only look at the
win/loss records and people who are asked about scores only look at the points scored or average points
scored records. It should be noted that the effects we report are stronger when we include the data from
these 8 experiments. The designs of these experiments included in Appendix A1.

21

any record information for the teams. 11 This allowed us to examine whether providing
this information was necessary to produce the hypothesized effect.
Prediction Quality
We were interested in investigating whether making detailed predictions affects the
quality of people’s predictions. For this reason, in all experiments we compare
participants’ predictions to well-calibrated sports betting markets, which publish odds set
by professional oddsmakers. For each game, oddsmakers use attributes such as team
records, home field advantage, and other information to determine the probability that
each team will win, and those probabilities are reflected in the odds that they set for each
game. These odds provide accurate probability estimates: For example, the home team
won 57.1% of the games when the odds indicated that they had a 55-60% chance of
winning in our data. Importantly, these odds indicate which team is the “likely winner,”
meaning that it is more likely to win the game than the opposing team. In our analyses,
predicting that the likely winner will win the game is considered a “wise” prediction. 12 In
all experiments, we assess the wisdom of participants’ winning team predictions,
regardless of prediction condition and what other detailed predictions they made.
11

Experiment 6 also had two conditions in which participants were given team records (wins, losses, points
scored, and points allowed) and two conditions in which participants were not given any records. For the
reasons stated in the previous footnote, only the two conditions that did not give record information are
included in the analyses presented here. However, we found the same detrimental effect of predicting the
score in both the conditions with records, t(27) = 2.29, p = .030, and without records, t(27) = 3.16, p = .004.
12
We could have also defined a wise prediction as a prediction in favor of the team with the superior
win/loss record. However, there are other important game attributes other than win/loss records that
significantly affect the probability that a team will win. For example, one of the notable differences
between predictions based on win/loss records and market odds is that sports betting markets take home
field advantage—which is known to affect game outcomes—into account. For this reason, using market
odds is the superior method of defining wise predictions. Indeed, the market odds are more correlated with
actual game outcomes (r(699) = 0.21, p < .001) than records alone (r(699) = 0.13, p < .001). However, the
patterns of results are largely consistent between the two specifications of wise predictions, and we report
the results of the main analyses defining wise predictions as choosing the team with the better win/loss
record in Appendix A3.
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Of course, another possible measure of prediction quality is accuracy. And, indeed,
this was the measure used by Yoon and colleagues (2013). However, accuracy is not an
appropriate measure of prediction quality in this context, as a wise prediction is one that
predicts that the most probable outcome will occur, regardless of whether that outcome
actually occurs. To illustrate, consider a biased coin that comes up heads 60% of the time.
A noisy and imprecise measure of prediction quality is whether someone’s prediction
about the outcome of the coin flip was accurate. A much better measure of prediction
quality is whether they predicted “heads”. Similarly, sports outcomes are extremely
noisy—across the 724 games in our data, the likely winner won only 57.7% of the time—
and so it would take many thousands of predictions about hundreds of games to detect
whether one condition makes more accurate predictions than another. 13 In this case, a
better measure of prediction quality is whether people predicted the teams that were most
likely to win as opposed to the teams that actually won. 14
Additional Measures
Winning Team Probabilities. In experiments 7, 9, 11, and 14-19, immediately after
predicting the outcomes of all games, participants indicated how likely each team would
be to win the game. Specifically, we asked participants to revisit each game and imagine
that the two teams played that exact same game 100 times, meaning that each of those
100 games would have the same time, location, players, injuries, etc. as the actual game
(see Appendix A2 for the exact wording of these instructions). Participants then reported
13

In fact, across all 724 games in our dataset, we find no significant effects of predicting scores on winning
team prediction accuracy. Thus, although we replicate Yoon et al.’s (2013) main result using a good
measure of prediction quality, we do not replicate their result using the measure of prediction quality that
they used.
14
We report the results of our main analyses using accuracy as the dependent measure in Appendix A3.
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how many games out of 100 they thought each team would win, and we converted these
responses into probabilities of each team winning the actual game. These self-reported
probabilities did not end up providing consistent evidence of participants’ prediction
processes, so we report their results in Appendix A2.
Reliance on Global vs. Local Information. In Experiments 1-16, we also collected
Yoon and colleagues’ (2013) measures of self-reported reliance on “global” and “local”
information for making predictions, where “global information” refers to holistic, overall
impressions of the teams, and “local information” refers to more nuanced information
about specific aspects of the teams (e.g., their offensive capabilities). After participants
made their predictions, we asked participants to “Please indicate the degree to which you
considered each of these factors while making your predictions” and had them rate how
much they considered three global factors (“overall impression of the two teams”,
“overall performance of the two teams in the past years”, “overall performance of the two
teams in recent years”) and three local factors (“the teams’ offensive abilities”, “the
teams’ defensive abilities”, “the teams’ coaching abilities”) on a scale from 1 (“not
considered at all”) to 7 (“seriously considered”). For experiments examining predictions
about baseball games, we included an additional local factor (“the teams’ pitching
abilities”) that was not included in, nor relevant for, Yoon et al.’s (2013) investigation of
soccer matches. All global and local considerations were presented in randomized order.
Following Yoon et al. (2013), we averaged participants’ ratings of the three global factors
into a single measure of “global considerations” (α = .68) and the four local factors into a
single measure of “local considerations” (α = .85) so we could attempt to replicate their
mediation analysis showing that people who predicted scores made worse winning team
24

predictions because they considered global factors less. The results of these analyses are
reported in detail in the Results section.
Sports Knowledge. We also collected information about participants’ knowledge and
familiarity with the sport league they made predictions about (e.g., Major League
Baseball). In all 19 experiments, after participants made all of their predictions, we asked
them eight questions designed to measure their knowledge and familiarity with the sport
league. These questions were designed to vary in difficulty, and consisted of matching
fairly well-known players to their teams, and matching teams to their division in the
league. The instructions encouraged participants to leave the question blank rather than
guess if they did not know the answer. The number of questions they answered correctly
serves as our measure of participants’ knowledge about the sport. 15 Participants’
knowledge scores varied considerably (M = 4.58, SD = 2.91), with 12.6% of the sample
answering no questions correctly and 23.7% of the sample answering all eight questions
correctly.
Other Measures. Additionally, at the end of each experiment, we collected other
exploratory measures (for example, prediction confidence and motivation). These
additional measures ended up providing little insight into our investigation, so we report
them and their results in Appendix A2. Finally, in all studies participants reported their

15

In experiments 6-19, we also had participants self-report “How closely do you follow [sport league]?”
and “How knowledgeable are you about [sport league]?” on scales from 1 (“not at all” / “not at all
knowledgeable”) to 7 (“extremely closely” / “extremely knowledgeable”). However, the percentage of wise
predictions participants made was more strongly correlated with the number of knowledge questions they
answered correctly (r(10369) = 0.22, p < .001) than it was with either their self-reported sports following
or self-reported sports knowledge (both rs(7783) = 0.15, ps < .001), so we use their knowledge question
scores as the main measure of knowledge in our analyses. The measured knowledge questions always came
after the self-reported knowledge questions in all experiments that included both.
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Mechanical Turk ID at the beginning of each experiment and their gender and age at the
end of each experiment.

Table 1. Experiments 1-19: Percentage of participants making wise predictions in each
prediction condition.
Experiment

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

Winner
Only

Score
Only

Score
+ Winner

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

1
MLB
316
41
67.3%a
61.4%b
2
MLB
508
39
73.3%a
67.4%b
69.7%ab
3
MLB
635
45
63.4%a
57.5%b
60.2%c
4
MLB
631
45
70.8%a
66.6%b
66.8%b
5
MLB
634
42
60.1%
58.8%
58.8%
60.2%
6
NHL
309
29
53.5%a
49.8%b
7
MLB
337
45
56.6%a
53.9%b
8
MLB
625
44
56.7%
55.7%
55.8%
9
MLB
422
41
60.9%
59.7%
10
MLB
728
45
59.3%
58.4%
58.5%
11
MLB
525
42
63.4%a
61.8%b
12
FIFA
622
48
61.2%a
57.8%b
13
NBA
420
32
70.3%
70.9%
14
NHL
541
32
70.0%
70.8%
15
NBA
775
32
74.1%
72.9%
72.4%
72.6%
16
NHL
711
30
73.3%
72.4%
71.4%
73.0%
17
NHL
811
31
74.8%a
70.8%b
75.2%a
18
NBA
828
30
78.4%
76.5%
78.3%
19
NHL
518
31
69.7%a
65.4%b
Note. Each row shows the mean percentage of participants choosing the likely winners across games within
each condition for that experiment. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using
within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
Experiment 3 manipulated whether the Score + Winner condition was paid based on the accuracy of their
score prediction or their winner prediction; the Score + Winner column collapses across these two
conditions. Experiments 4, 8, and 10 included two Relevant + Winner conditions, a condition in which
participants first predicted total runs and a condition in which participants first predicted each team’s hits;
the Relevant + Winner column collapses across these two conditions. The relevant predictions made in
Experiments 5, 15, and 16 were total runs scored, free throws attempted by each team, and saves made by
each team, respectively. Experiments 17 and 18 included two Irrelevant + Winner conditions, a condition in
which participants predicted the temperature outside the indoor stadium at the start of the game and a
condition where participants predicted the high temperature in the game city on July 4th 2015 (about 6
months after the game); the Irrelevant + Winner column collapses across these two conditions. The
irrelevant predictions made in Experiments 5, 15 and 16 were total game time, temperature outside the
stadium at game time, and percentage of U.S. citizens in the crowd, respectively. FIFA = Fédération
Internationale de Football Association; MLB = Major League Baseball; NBA = National Basketball
Association; NHL = National Hockey League.

26

RESULTS
Most of our analyses analyze responses at the game level, examining for each game
whether more participants made wise predictions when they were simply asked to select
the winning team than when they were also (or instead) asked to make a detailed
prediction. Using game as the level of analysis has the benefit of controlling for
differences across games, while also allowing us to explore whether effects emerge for
some games and not others. We could have instead analyzed these data at the participant
level, examining the percentage of wise predictions each participant made, or at the
prediction level, examining whether each individual prediction was wise or unwise.
These alternative methods of analysis yield similar results and are reported in Appendix
A3.
Does predicting scores make winner predictions worse?
We expected participants’ winning team predictions to be worse when they were
asked to predict final scores in addition to (or instead of) selecting winning teams. As
shown in Table 1 and Figure 2, this expectation was confirmed. Participants in the
Winner condition (M = 65.5%, SD = 25.3%) made wiser predictions than participants in
the Score Only and Score + Winner conditions (M = 63.0%, SD = 23.9%), t(708) =11.92,
p < .001. 16 , 17 This is a small- to medium-sized effect: d = .45. 18 This pattern was
observed in 17 of 19 experiments, it was statistically significant in 12 of them, and it was
16

For 15 of the 724 games in our sample, oddsmakers assigned an equal probability of winning to both
teams, and so there was no “likely winner” for these games. Thus, data from these 15 games are excluded
from all analyses that hinge on using betting market odds to identify a likely winner.
17
For experiments containing both Score Only and Score + Winner conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), this
analysis and the data reported in Figure 2 collapse these conditions into a single Score condition.
18
For a paired-samples t-test, Cohen’s d is computed by dividing the mean difference by the standard
deviation of the difference. In this analysis, the standard deviation of the difference was 5.5% and so
Cohen’s d is (.655-.633)/.055 = .45.
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in the expected direction for the majority of the games in our sample (68.1%), Χ2(1, N =
724) = 92.43, p < .001.

Figure 2. Experiments 1-19: The difference in the percentage of wise predictions in the

Difference in % of wise predictions
(Winner minus Score conditions)

Winner vs. Score conditions.
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Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error adjusted to show within-subjects variation (Cousineau, 2005;
Morey, 2008). Experiment 1’s result compares the Winner to the Score Only condition, and the results from
Experiment 2 and 3 compare the Winner condition to the average of the Score Only and Score + Winner
conditions. The results of Experiments 4-19 compare the Winner condition to the Score + Winner condition.

Further analyses revealed that the negative effect of making score predictions was
robust to variations across experiments and conditions. First, we observed the effect
across sports. The Winner condition significantly outperformed the Score conditions in
predictions of all sports except NBA basketball, for which the effect was marginal. 19 We

19

Respectively, the separate t-tests for baseball, basketball, hockey, and soccer were: t(421) = 9.45, p
< .001; t(92) = 1.92, p = .058; t(146) = 5.74, p < .001; t(46) = 5.38, p < .001.
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also observed the effect across incentive structures. In Experiment 3, we manipulated
whether the Score + Winner condition was incentivized for predicting the exact final
score or for predicting the winner. It did not matter: The Winner condition significantly
outperformed both, ts(44) > 3.25, p’s < .003, and the two Score + Winner conditions did
not differ from each other, t(44) = 1.07, p = .29. Finally, in Experiments 6 and 12, we did
not give participants any team records as they made their predictions. This also did not
matter: Participants in the Score + Winner condition still fared worse than participants in
the Winner condition, ts > 3.15, ps < .004.
Does predicting other event details make predictions worse?
So far, we have seen evidence that predicting final scores makes winning team
predictions worse. A final score prediction is a special type of detailed prediction in that
it is a more detailed version of the winning team prediction, as one’s final score
prediction unambiguously reveals which team they think will win the game. Therefore,
people who predict final scores presumably also have to think about which team will win
the game as well as other information when making their predictions. However, if
predicting final scores makes predictions worse because it increases the accessibility of
information that is not useful for predicting the winner, then we would expect predictions
about any relevant game details to have this effect. For example, asking participants to
predict how many times each hockey team’s goalie will block the opposing team from
scoring might cause them to think more about the capabilities of the teams’ goalies, and
although this information might be useful in isolation, it would probably not provide
diagnostic information over and above the teams’ win/loss records since a goalie’s ability
directly affects how often his team wins.
29

In six of our experiments, we included conditions in which participants made detailed
predictions about a different game outcome other than the final score before predicting
the winner. For example, the number of hits each baseball team accumulates
(Experiments 4, 8, and 10), the number of free throws each basketball team attempts
(Experiment 15), or the number of saves each hockey team’s goalie makes (Experiment
16) are relevant to the game because they influence the game’s outcome. Similarly, the
number of total runs in a baseball game (Experiments 4, 5, 8, and 10) is a relevant
prediction because the game might unfold differently depending on whether the contest is
low-scoring or high-scoring. 20
Across six experiments (n = 238 games), participants in conditions that predicted
relevant details other than the score before predicting the winning teams predicted the
likely winners to win less often (M = 63.1%, SD = 25.5%) than participants in conditions
that only predicted winning teams (M = 64.9%, SD = 27.2%), t(231) = 5.60, p < .001.21
This is a small-to-medium-sized effect: d = .37. We can also test whether predicting nonscore relevant details worsens winner predictions as much as predicting the score does.
The difference between the Score + Winner condition (M = 63.2%, SD = 25.2%) and
conditions in which participants predicted non-score relevant details was not significant,
t(231) = 0.35, p = .72. These analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that predicting

20

Also, it is commonplace in sports betting for people to bet on whether the combined number of points
scored by both teams will fall above or below a pre-specified total called the “over/under”.
21
Three of these experiments (4, 8, and 10) included two conditions asking participants to predict a
relevant detail (other than the score) before predicting the winner. Specifically, in these experiments
participants predicted either the number of hits each of two baseball teams would accrue (Hits + Winner
condition) or the total number of runs that would be scored in the game (Runs + Winner condition). The
analysis reported in the text averages across these two conditions. However, the results remain significant if
we run the analyses using only the Runs + Winner condition from these three experiments, t(231) = 5.70, p
< .001, or using only the Hits + Winner condition from these three experiments, , t(231) = 4.39, p < .001.

30

any relevant detail about an event will make predictions about more general outcomes
worse. Next, we will focus on evaluating different possible explanations for why making
detailed predictions makes predictions worse.
Figure 3. Experiments 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 16: The average percentage of participants
making wise predictions in the Winner, Score + Winner, and Relevant + Winner
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conditions.
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Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error adjusted to show withinsubjects variation (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008).

Are predictions worse because people pay less attention?
So far, we have found that participants in the Winner condition, who are required to
make simple categorical predictions (Winner condition), make better predictions than
those in detailed conditions, who were additionally (or instead) required to make multiple,
more difficult, free-entry predictions. It could be the case, then, that people who make
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detailed predictions make worse winning team predictions because they are more likely
to become fatigued or confused, or are more likely to stop paying attention to the
prediction task than participants in the Winner condition.
To investigate this, five of our experiments included conditions in which people were
asked to predict an irrelevant detail before predicting the winning team. In our
experiments, an “Irrelevant” detailed prediction is one that is unrelated to how the game
will unfold. Importantly, while information about irrelevant details would be more
accessible after making irrelevant detailed predictions, it should not feel sufficiently
relevant to inform winning team predictions, and therefore should be omitted from
consideration. In Experiment 5, participants in the Time + Winner condition predicted the
duration of each baseball game in hours and minutes. In Experiment 16, participants in
the Crowd + Winner condition predicted the percentage of fans in attendance who would
be United States citizens for each game (many NHL hockey games attract non-American
fans, especially those played in or near Canada). In Experiments 15 and 18 (basketball),
and in Experiment 17 (hockey) participants in the Temperature + Winner condition
predicted the outdoor temperature at the location and start time of each (indoor) game.
Finally, Experiments 17 and 18 included an additional irrelevant detailed prediction in
which participants predicted the high temperature in the game’s location on July 4th, 2015
(approximately 6 months after the game).
Like the participants who predicted scores and other relevant details about the game,
participants who predicted irrelevant details made multiple, more difficult, free-entry
predictions. Thus, if the fatigue or confusion that comes from making multiple detailed
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predictions is driving the effect, we should find that predictions are worse among those
who predicted these irrelevant details as well.
However, this was not so. Across five experiments (n = 165 games), those who
predicted an irrelevant event detail prior to predicting the winning team fared no worse
(M = 71.0%, SD = 27.7%) than those who only predicted the winner (M = 71.2%, SD =
27.7%), t(161) = 0.81, p = .42. If this effect exists, we estimate it to be tiny: d = .06.
Furthermore, this null effect can be put into context by the fact that participants who
predicted irrelevant event details significantly outperformed participants who predicted
final scores (M = 69.4%, SD = 26.2%), t(161) = 3.64, p < .001. This is a small- to
medium-sized effect: d = .29. 22
Thus, whereas predicting relevant details about the games resulted in winning team
predictions that closely resembled those of the participants who predicted final scores,
predicting irrelevant event details resulted in winning team predictions that closely
resembled those of the participants who only predicted the winners. This suggests that the
negative effect of making detailed predictions on winning team prediction quality is not
due to increased levels of fatigue, confusion, or inattention, but rather because it makes
them think differently about the event itself.

22

Two of these experiments (17 and 18) included two conditions asking participants to predict a irrelevant
detail before predicting the winner. Specifically, in these experiments participants predicted either the
temperature outside the arena at the time and location of the game (Temperature + Winner condition) or the
temperature in the game city on July 4th 2015 (July 4th + Winner condition). The analysis reported in the
text averages across these two conditions. However, the results remain qualitatively identical if we run the
analyses using only the Temperature + Winner condition from these two experiments (Winner vs.
Irrelevant: t(161) = 1.14, p = .26; Score vs. Irrelevant: t(161) = 3.44, p < .001) or using only the July 4th +
Winner condition from these two experiments (Winner vs. Irrelevant: t(161) = 0.47, p = .64; Score vs.
Irrelevant: t(161) = 3.67, p < .001).
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Figure 4. Experiments 5 and 15-18: The average percentage of participants making wise
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Are predictions worse because people think harder?
Some researchers have claimed that conscious, deliberative thinking can sometimes
lead to worse choices and predictions than unconscious, intuitive thinking (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, and Dijksterhuis et al., 2009; however, the existence of this
unconscious thought advantage has been challenged in a recent meta-analysis by
Nieuwenstein et al., 2015). This raises the question of whether predicting scores makes
winner predictions worse because predicting scores is more difficult and therefore causes
people to think harder, as Yoon et al. (2013) interpreted their results to indicate.
To test whether thinking harder makes predictions worse, we ran three experiments
(13, 14, 19; n = 95 games) in which we incentivized participants to think harder about
34

some games than others. Again, participants were randomly assigned to only predict
winning teams (Winner condition) or to predict final scores in addition to predicting
winning teams (Score + Winner condition). Additionally, within-subjects, half of the
games were assigned to either be worth either a smaller bonus (5 cents) or a much larger
bonus (25 cents in Experiments 13 and 14, and 20 cents in Experiment 19—very large
bonuses for a single question in a Mechanical Turk study). Which games were worth
small and large bonuses was randomized between-subjects. 23
We expected participants to think harder about the games that were worth a much
larger bonus than usual. After making their predictions, participants reported “Overall,
how carefully did you think about each game before making your winning team
predictions?” and “Overall, how much effort did you invest in thinking about and making
your predictions?” separately for the low- and high-incentive games. 24 Participants’
ratings of thinking carefully about predictions and investing effort in making predictions
were highly consistent (αs = .90 for both the low- and high-incentive games), so we
averaged the two responses into a single measure of “thinking hard” about predictions.
Participants reported thinking harder about the high-incentive games than the low-

23

In Experiments 13 and 14, we first informed participants that they would be rewarded a 5-cent bonus
each time they correctly predicted the winning team. After making sixteen predictions, they reported
“Overall, how carefully did you think about each game before making your winning team predictions?” and
“Overall, how much effort did you invest in thinking about and making your predictions?” We then
informed them that the amount of the bonus had been increased to 25 cents per correct winning team
prediction for a remaining block of games. They then made predictions about an additional sixteen games
and rated how carefully they thought about and how much effort they invested in making predictions for
just those sixteen 25-cent games. In Experiment 19, we informed participants at the outset that some games
would be worth more than others. They then made all thirty low- and high-incentive predictions at once.
The amount of the bonus (5 cents vs. 20 cents) was displayed prominently and alternated between games.
After making all of their predictions, they rated how carefully they thought about and how much effort they
invested in making their predictions separately for the 5-cent games and the 20-cent games.
24
This wording is taken from Experiment 13 and 14. The wording of these questions was slightly different
in Experiment 19, and is reported Appendix A2.
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incentive games in both the Winner condition (M = 5.80, SD = 1.16 vs. M = 5.44, SD =
1.25, t(748) = 13.36, p < .001) and Score + Winner condition (M = 5.85, SD = 1.14 vs. M
= 5.50, SD = 1.22, t(685) = 12.56, p < .001). However, participants in the Score + Winner
condition did not report thinking significantly harder about either low- or high-incentive
games than participants in the Winner condition (ts < 0.91, ps > .36).
If predicting scores worsens predictions because it makes people think harder, then
making people think harder should decrease the quality of their predictions, especially
among those in the Winner condition, who were presumably not thinking as hard as
participants in the Score + Winner condition before. This was not the case. Participants in
the Winner condition did not make significantly worse predictions when the stakes were
higher (M = 70.0%, SD = 17.4%) than when they were lower (M = 70.1%, SD = 16.8%),
t(94) = 0.23, p = .82, and participants in the Score + Winner condition made directionally
wiser predictions when the stakes were higher (M = 69.2%, SD = 17.2%) than when they
were lower (M = 68.7%, SD = 15.8%), t(94) = 1.21, p = .23. Furthermore, regardless of
incentive, participants who reported thinking harder actually made a greater percentage
of wise predictions, b = 0.87%, t(2889) = 3.73, p < .001. 25 ,
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Finally, as usual,

participants in the Winner condition made wiser predictions than participants in the Score
+ Winner condition for both low- and high-incentive games, ts > 2.25, ps < .027. These

25

Analysis includes fixed effects for experiment.
Dijksterhuis et al. (2009) found that the unconscious thought advantage was moderated by “expertise” as
defined by above-median self-reported knowledge, such that only experts derived an advantage from
unconscious thinking when they made predictions about soccer game outcomes. However, we found no
such moderation of self-reported knowledge on the effect of thinking hard on average prediction quality, b
= -0.19%, t(2798) = -1.27, p = .17. Furthermore, amongst the 124 participants who reported the highest
level of sports knowledge, thinking hard was marginally positively correlated with making a greater
percentage of wise low- and high-incentive predictions, r(246) = 0.11, p < .10.
26
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results suggest that thinking hard about predictions does not explain why people who
make detailed predictions make worse winning team predictions.

Figure 5. Experiments 13, 14, and 19: The average percentage of participants making
wise predictions in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions for low- versus high-
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Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error adjusted to show within-subjects variation (Cousineau, 2005;
Morey, 2008)

Are predictions worse because people think less globally or more locally?
In a previous investigation of why predicting scores makes winning team predictions
worse, Yoon et al. (2013) found that predicting scores made people think about global
information marginally less, and this marginally mediated the relationship between
37

predicting scores and prediction accuracy. We did not replicate these results. Across 16
experiments (experiments 1-16, n = 6,541 participants) we found that predicting scores
had no effect on self-rated reliance on global considerations, b = -0.006, t(6525) = 0.19, p
= .85. We did find that that predicting the score had a very small but marginally positive
effect on ratings of local considerations, b = 0.071, t(6525) = 1.83, p = .067, and that an
increase in local considerations had a small but significant effect on the percentage of
wise predictions made, b = 0.206%, t(6525) = 2.53, p = .012. However, a bootstrap
mediation analysis (Preacher & Kelley, 2011) revealed that this increase in local
considerations did not even partially mediate the effect of predicting the score on winning
team prediction quality, bindirect effect = 1.57 x 10-4, 95% CI = [-1.78 x 10-5, 4.04 x 10-4].
Thus, we believe it is unlikely that detailed predictions make predictions worse because
they cause people to consider global factors less or local factors more.
Do people who make detailed predictions use useful information less?
Although our data do not reveal exactly what information participants were thinking
about when making their predictions, we can examine how participants used the
information that we gave them. Each experiment (with the exception of Experiments 6
and 12) gave participants at least two pieces of information: win/loss records and home
team status. Both win/loss records and home field advantage are diagnostic for
determining how likely a team is to win a game, and together these variables account for
66% of the variation in the probabilities set by Vegas oddsmakers for the games in our
dataset.
We used logistic regressions to estimate how much a team’s win/loss record and
home team status influenced each participant’s likelihood of predicting the team to win
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the game. 27 Specifically, for each participant in each experiment, we estimated the
probability they would predict the team to win the game based on whether or not that
team had the better record (specifically, whether they had won a greater percentage of
games than their opponent) and whether or not that team was the home team. 28
Additionally, we expected that people’s use of win/loss records and home field advantage
would depend on how competitive the game was. We defined a maximally competitive
game as one in which the teams have near-identical win/loss records (indicating they are
evenly matched), and a non-competitive game as one in which one team has a much
better win/loss record than the other (indicating they are very unevenly matched). Our
measure for the competitiveness of the game was the absolute difference between the two
teams’ Win Percentages, for which values ranged from 0 (the teams had identical Win
Percentages) to 1 (one team had won every game and the other team had lost every
game). We predicted that as games became less competitive (i.e., as the disparity between
the teams’ win/loss records became more extreme), people would rely more on which
team had the better record and less on home field advantage for making predictions.
Thus, we interacted dummies for whether the team had the better record and whether the
team was the home team with how competitive the game was:

27

These analyses do not include Experiments 6 and 12 because we did not provide win/loss record
information for these experiments.
28
Since we are analyzing how characteristics of teams affect participants’ likelihood of predicting them to
win, the data were recoded so that each team was a separate observation with whether the team was
predicted to win as the dichotomous dependent variable and home team status and the teams’ record
information as predictor variables. This means that each prediction generated two observations: one for the
chosen team and one for the unchosen team. To adjust for the fact that these team pairs contribute the same
information, we clustered standard errors by participant-game.
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑤) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽2 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽3 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∗ |𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑| + 𝛽4 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ |𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑|

Once we estimated the weights given to team records and home field advantage for
each participant in each experiment, we analyzed how detailed predictions affected
information use by comparing these weights between participants in different prediction
conditions.
Table 2 reports the marginal effects of having the better record, being the home team,
and the competitiveness of the game on the likelihood of predicting a team to win for
participants in the Winner condition. When games were maximally competitive (i.e.,
when teams had near-identical Win Percentages), 29 participants in the Winner condition
were 17.0% more likely on average to predict the team to win when it had the better
record than when its opponent had the better record, and 13.6% more likely on average to
predict the team to win when it was the home team than when it was the visiting team.
We can also see how the use of this information changes as games become less
competitive. As expected, we find that people relied on whether the team had the better
record more and whether the team was the home team less as the disparity between the
teams’ records increased.

29

The twelve games where the two teams had identical Win Percentages were dropped from this analysis
because neither team had the better win/loss record.
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Table 2. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: How much weight participants in the Winner
condition gave to win/loss records and home field advantage when making predictions.
Coefficients

Winner

better record

0.170 ***

home team

0.136 ***

| record difference |

-3.302 ***

better record * | record difference |
home team * | record difference |

2.522 ***
-1.172 ***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Next we examine how participants’ use of win/loss records and home field advantage
differed between prediction conditions. However, because the various types of detailed
predictions spanned different experiments and therefore different sets of games, we
cannot directly compare the coefficients for information use in the detailed prediction
conditions to the coefficients in Table 2, because they would be estimated from different
populations. For this reason, Table 3 reports the differences in information use from the
Winner condition for each type of detailed prediction conditions (Score, Relevant, and
Irrelevant) in the experiments that include both. By using the Winner condition as a
benchmark in each set of games (i.e., games with Score conditions, games with Relevant
conditions, games with Irrelevant conditions), we can see how participants’ use of team
records and home field advantage changed based on the type of detailed predictions they
made.
In Table 3, a positive coefficient indicates that participants who made detailed
predictions gave that information more weight than participants in the Winner condition,
and a negative coefficient indicates that they gave that information less weight. Figure 6
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similarly displays the marginal effects of having the better record and being the home
team on the likelihood of predicting the team to win separately for the Winner and
detailed prediction conditions for each set of games.
Table 3 and Figure 6 reveal that participants who predicted scores gave significantly
less weight to both which team had the better record and which team was playing at home
than participants in the Winner condition, and participants who predicted other relevant
details gave directionally less weight to which team had the better record and
significantly less weight to which team was playing at home. Furthermore, these
decreases in weight were greater for home field advantage than for having the better
record. Interestingly, the people who predicted irrelevant details gave these two cues
directionally more weight than people in the Winner condition; however, these
differences were not significant. These results show that people who made relevant
detailed predictions (including final scores) gave less weight to important diagnostic
information than people who only predicted winning teams. This is the pattern we would
expect if people who make relevant detailed predictions consider less important
information while making winning team predictions.
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Table 3. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: Differences in information weights from the
Winner condition in the detailed prediction conditions.
Coefficients

Score

Relevant

Irrelevant

better record

-0.058 ***

-0.020

0.035

home team

-0.116 ***

-0.079 ***

0.037

| record difference |

0.149

better record * | record difference |

-0.677 **

0.237

-0.033

-0.513

-0.419

home team * | record difference |

0.381 ***

0.036

0.448

Number of participants in sample

5,537

1,958

1,541

644

235

162

Number of games in sample
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Figure 6. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: The increase in the likelihood of predicting a
team to win when it had the better record and when it was the home team for Winner vs.
Score conditions (A), Winner vs. Relevant detailed conditions (B), and Winner vs.
Irrelevant detailed.

A.

35%

W = Winner
S = Score _

30%
25%

B.

C.
W = Winner__
I = Irrelevant

W = Winner_
R = Relevant

20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

17%

11%

14%

24% 22%
2%

15%

24%
7%

28%

15%

19%

W
I
W
R
W
S
W
R
W
I
W
S
better record home team better record home team better record home team

Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error of the interaction between information use and prediction
condition (Winner vs. detailed). The coefficients for chart A only include games that had final score
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prediction conditions (n = 644 games), the coefficients for chart B only include games that had non-score
relevant prediction conditions (n = 235 games), and the coefficients for chart C only include games that had
irrelevant prediction conditions (n = 162 games).

Which games will show the effect?
If detailed predictions cause people to give less weight to the teams’ win/loss records
and home team status, then detailed predictions might not always make predictions
worse. Consider two different types of games in our sample. In some games, the home
team had the better record, meaning that both of the cues that people rely on to predict the
winner (win/loss records and home field advantage) indicate that the home team is more
likely to win. Since making detailed predictions causes people to give less weight to both
of these cues, the difference in prediction quality between the non-detailed and relevantdetailed conditions should be most pronounced for these games. The right-hand side of
Figure 7 shows this to be the case: When the home team had the better record, people
who predicted relevant details about the game were considerably less likely to predict the
home team to win.
Now consider a different type of game: one for which the visiting team had the better
record. For these games, the cues that people rely on to predict the winner point in
opposite directions: choosing the team with the better record would result in predicting
the visiting team, whereas choosing the team that with the home field advantage would
result in predicting the team with the inferior record. Since making detailed predictions
causes people to be less likely to predict the team with the better record but more likely to
predict the visiting team (since they largely ignore home field advantage), the difference
between the non-detailed and detailed conditions might not emerge for these games. The
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left-hand side of Figure 7 shows this to be the case: When the visiting team had the better
record, people who predicted relevant game details did not predict any differently those
whose who only predicted winners.

Figure 7. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: The percentage of participants predicting
that the home team would win by prediction condition and difference in win/loss records.
100%
90%
80%

74.8%

60%

68.8%

70%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

0%

9.7%
9.1%

< -30%
n = 15

13.7%
14.7%

20.2%
20.8%

86.5%
81.4%

36.9%

Visiting team has the better record

86.2%

92.3%

90.3%

93.8%

92.7%

Winner & Irrelevant

35.8%

-30 to -20% -20 to -10% -10 to 0%
n = 40
n = 110
n = 213

89.6%

Score & Relevant

0 to 10%
n = 154

10 to 20%
n = 90

20 to 30%
n = 17

30 to 40%
n = 23

Home team has the better record

Home team Win % minus Visiting team Win %

> 40%
n = 14

Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error adjusted to show within-subjects variation (Cousineau, 2005;
Morey, 2008).

Similarly, we can examine the effect that the consistency of the two cues has on the
propensity to make wise predictions. The right side of Figure 8 illustrates that when the
information we give them is diagnostically consistent (the home team also has the better
record), people who predict relevant game details make considerably less wise
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predictions than people who only predict winners (M = -4.8%, t(295) = 13.64, p < .001),
but when the information we give them is inconsistent (the home team has the inferior
record), this difference is much smaller (M = -0.9%, t(354) = 3.60, p < .001).
Figure 8. Experiments 1-19: The percentage of participants making wise predictions by

% choosing the likely winner

whether the home team also had the better record.
80%

75%
70%
65%

79.0%

60%
55%
50%

55.5%

Winner &
Irrelevant

54.6%

Score &
Relevant

visiting team has better record

Winner &
Irrelevant

74.2%

Score &
Relevant

home team has better record

Note. Errors bars indicate ±1 standard error adjusted to show within-subjects variation (Cousineau, 2005;
Morey, 2008).

Thus, by understanding the process by which detailed predictions affect prediction
quality, we can predict when the effect will emerge and when it will not. In this context,
it will emerge when giving less weight to both the teams’ records and home field
advantage will alter predictions (as when the home teams have better records) but not
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when giving less weight to both of these cues will not (as when the visiting teams have
better records).
This finding is important because it allows us to predict how this effect will play out
in other prediction contexts. To predict when the effect will emerge, it will be important
to first identify which cues are given less weight by people making detailed predictions.
Then, one needs to consider how giving that cue less weight would affect the wisdom of
predictions. When the available information offers conflicting diagnoses, giving all cues
less weight might not actually alter the quality of those predictions, and so making
detailed predictions might have no effect on the quality of other predictions. Moreover, if
these cues are normally overweighted rather than underweighted, then making detailed
predictions may actually improve prediction quality.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this paper, we investigated whether and why making detailed predictions about an
event makes predictions of other outcomes worse. We found that asking participants to
make predictions about any relevant detail in sports games resulted in worse winning
team predictions. We also largely ruled out the possibility that this effect could be
explained by inattention or fatigue, thinking too hard, or thinking about global
impressions of the teams less. Rather, our data suggest that making detailed predictions
makes other similar predictions worse by influencing what information forecasters did
(and did not) incorporate into their predictions. We further found that detailed predictions
only negatively affected games for which there was consistent diagnostic information—
namely, games for which the home team also had the better record.
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We already knew from past research that the information given to forecasters affects
the quality of their predictions; however, to the best of our knowledge it was unknown
whether asking forecasters to make additional similar predictions could also affect
prediction quality. We believe that this happens because having people predict the details
of an event makes them think about additional information that is unimportant for
predicting other related outcomes; however, once this information is made accessible in
memory, people are more likely to use it in their forecasts, decreasing the weight given to
more important information. This suggests that a relatively simple way to improve
predictions could be to take a top-down approach and start by first predicting the most
general outcomes and then letting those forecasts guide predictions of more detailed
outcomes. Importantly, this prescription is not intuitive, as most decision-makers feel
compelled to try to think through all of the available details about an event before making
their forecasts (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003).
Our results also reveal that a negative effect of making detailed predictions on
subsequent related predictions is not universal. Because participants who predicted game
details used both home team status and record advantage less, we only found a sizeable
detrimental effect when both pieces of information favored the same team (i.e., the home
team had the better record), in which case the effect of the reduction in the use of the two
cues was compounded, and the effect was largely eliminated when each piece of
information favored a different team (i.e., the visiting team had the better record), in
which case the effect of the reduction of the use of the two cues partially canceled out.
In fact, if predicting additional details about an event decreases the weight placed on
heavily weighted cues, then we can imagine cases where making detailed predictions
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could actually make subsequent predictions better. In our experiments, participants
generally had a good sense that having the better record and being the home team were
predictive of winning the game, and that, for most games, having the better record is
more important than being the home team. However, what about circumstances where
people do not have good intuitions about what information is important? For example,
someone who wants to forecast demand for a novel piece of wearable technology might
believe that computing capability is more important to consumers than stylishness, when
in fact the reverse might be true. In this case, having the forecaster make additional
detailed predictions (e.g., which of the product’s features will be most attractive?) might
inadvertently make his forecasts better because doing so would reduce the weight given
to an over-weighted attribute. This example emphasizes the importance of understanding
how forecasters are already using the information available to them in order to
understand how making additional detailed predictions would affect their other
predictions.
Another point of concern moving forward is that it is not clear how people integrate
conflicting information when making predictions in this context, and it is also not clear
how predicting other details would affect how forecasters combine conflicting cues. Past
research on how people use conflicting information is mixed, with some finding that the
less important of the conflicting cues is largely ignored (Keeley & Doherty, 1972; Mertz
& Doherty, 1974; Slovic, 1966; Yaniv, 2004), others saying that people are able to
integrate the inconsistent cues in a roughly linear fashion (Lichtenstein et al., 1975; York,
Doherty, & Kamouri, 1987), and others still saying that whether the inconsistent
information is disregarded or integrated varies based on other attributes, such as task
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predictability (Brehmer, 1972). The fact that the differences between detailed and nondetailed prediction conditions is smaller for games with conflicting cues is consistent
with both omission and linear combination models of conflicting cue use. Overall, this
suggests that identifying forecasters’ intuitive weights and methods for combining
conflicting information in the specific prediction context being examined would likely be
a necessary precursor for predicting whether making detailed predictions would make
other predictions worse.
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APPENDIX A1: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTION AND DESIGNS
All experiments had similar designs. In the interest of clarity and brevity, we first
present an example of a prototypical experiment. Then, we will present the details of each
individual experiment in terms of the predictions that were made, the different
experimental conditions, and how they differed from the prototypical design. Any
questions about the instructions, stimuli, or survey designs should be directed to Theresa
Kelly.

Example Experiment
In the example below, each image represents a separate page in the survey. The
images used in the example are taken from Experiment 8.

Figure A1 1. Example Experiment: Informed consent.
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Figure A1 2. Example Experiment: Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 3. Example Experiment: Winner condition predictions.

Note. The game shown in the example above was followed by the other 12 games scheduled to be played
that same day displayed one after the other on the same page. After the first page of games, the next page
followed the exact same format, including the instructions at the top of the page, but for all of the games for
the next day. This repeated for as many days as were included in the experiment. In this example, there
were three days of games and therefore three pages of predictions.
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Figure A1 4. Example Experiment: Score + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 5. Example Experiment: Score + Winner predictions.

Note. Participants were restricted from entering tied scores. The game shown in the example above was
followed by the other 12 games scheduled to be played that same day displayed one after the other on the
same page. After the first page of games, the next page followed the exact same format, including the
instructions at the top of the page, but for all of the games for the next day. This repeated for as many days
as were included in the experiment. In this example, there were three days of games and therefore three
pages of predictions.
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Figure A1 6. Example Experiment: Prediction strategy.

Note. Participants were required to enter a minimum of 25 characters.

Figure A1 7. Example Experiment: “Global” and “local” considerations.

Note. The order of items was randomized between participants. The item “the teams’ pitching abilities”
only appeared for Major League Baseball games and was omitted for all experiments using other sports.
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Figure A1 8. Example Experiment: Winner condition confidence and motivation.

Figure A1 9. Example Experiment: Score + Winner condition confidence and motivation.

Note. See the “additional measures” section of the Supplement for the exact wording of the confidence and
motivation questions for predictions other than the winning team and final score.
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Figure A1 10. Example Experiment: Self-reported following and knowledge.
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Figure A1 11. Example Experiment: Measured knowledge.

Note. The order of questions was randomized between participants. Players and teams used varied between
experiments. Participants were not required to answer any of these questions.
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Figure A1 12. Example Experiment: Gender, age, and contact.

Figure A1 13. Example Experiment: Survey completion.
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Individual Experiments
Each experiment is accompanied by a Experiment Design Table that provides
information about the number and types of predictions in the experiment, the different
conditions, what record information was given, and ways that the experiment deviated
from the Example Experiment in the previous section.
For each experiment, we also give one example of the predictions made in each
condition. The separate instructions page for a new condition is only given for first
experiment that that condition appears in (e.g., the Hits + Winner condition appears in
Experiments 4, 8, and 10, but we only give the instructions in the description of
Experiment 4).
All the games for a single day were displayed on a single page with the exception of
Experiments 13, 14, and 17-19. Descriptions of how the display format of the predictions
for these experiments are explained in their respective Experiment Design Tables.
The experiments in this section do NOT repeat all of the measures collected.
However, any additional measures that differed from the Example Experiment are
described in the Experiment Design Table. To see what these individual measures look
like, refer to the “Additional Measures” supplement.
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Experiment 1
Table A1 1. Experiment 1 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

Other deviations
from the example
format

41 Major League Baseball games played on June 4th (15 games),
June 5th (15 games), and June 6th (11 games) in 2013.
June 3rd, 2013
Winner, Score Only
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅ Prediction strategy
⋅ Motivation and confidence
⋅ Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.
⋅
⋅

Maximizing Tendency Scale (included for an unrelated
study).

⋅

The Winner condition was incentivized 5 cents for correctly
predicting the winner and the Score Only condition was
incentivized 40 cents for correctly predicting the exact final
score.
Participants were not reminded of the payoff amounts for
each game (e.g. “If you correctly predict the winner of this
game, you will earn $0.05”).

⋅
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Figure A1 14. Experiment 1: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 15. Experiment 1: Score Only condition predictions.
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Experiment 2
Table A1 2. Experiment 2 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

Other deviations
from the example
format

39 Major League Baseball games played on June 11th (15
games), June 12th (15 games), and June 13th (9 games) in 2013.
June 10th, 2013
Winner, Score Only, Score + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅ Prediction strategy
⋅ Motivation and confidence
⋅ Self-reported following and knowledge
⋅ Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.
⋅

Maximizing Tendency Scale (included for an unrelated
experiment).

⋅

The Winner condition was incentivized 5 cents for correctly
predicting the winner and the Score Only and Score +
Winner conditions were incentivized 40 cents for correctly
predicting the exact final score.
Participants were not reminded of the payoff amounts for
each game.
The winner selection question was displayed before the score
entry in the Score + Winner condition for each game.

⋅
⋅

63

Figure A1 16. Experiment 2: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 17. Experiment 2: Score Only condition predictions.
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Figure A1 18. Experiment 2: Score + Winner condition predictions.

Note. Participants were incentivized for correctly predicting the exact final score.
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Experiment 3
Table A1 3. Experiment 3 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment

45 Major League Baseball games played on July 19th (15
games), July 20th (15 games), and July 21st (15 games) in 2013.
July 18th, 2013.
Winner, Score Only, Score + Winner (bonus for winner), Score
+ Winner (bonus for score)
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅
⋅

⋅
Other deviations
from the example
format

Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.
The Winner condition and one of the Score + Winner
conditions were incentivized $0.05 for correctly predicting
the winner, while the Score Only condition and the other
Score + Winner condition were incentivized $1.50 for
correctly predicting the exact final score.

Figure A1 19. Experiment 3: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 20. Experiment 3: Score Only condition predictions.
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Figure A1 21. Experiment 3: Score + Winner condition predictions (incentivized for
correct winning team selection).
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Figure A1 22. Experiment 3: Score + Winner condition predictions (incentivized for
correct exact final score).
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Experiment 4
Table A1 4. Experiment 4 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment

45 Major League Baseball games played on July 26th (15
games), July 27th (15 games), and July 28th (15 games) in 2013.
July 26th, 2013.
Winner, Score + Winner, Hits + Winner, Runs + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge,
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.

Figure A1 23. Experiment 4: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 24. Experiment 4: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 25. Experiment 4: Hits + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 26. Experiment 4: Hits + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 27. Experiment 4: Runs + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 28. Experiment 4: Runs + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment 5
Table A1 5. Experiment 5 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment

42 Major League Baseball games played on September 16th (12
games), September 17th (15 games), and September 18th (15
games) in 2013.
September 16th, 2013
Winner, Score + Winner, Runs + Winner, Time + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.

Figure A1 29. Experiment 5: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 30. Experiment 5: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 31. Experiment 5: Runs + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 32. Experiment 5: Time + Winner instructions.

Figure A1 33. Time + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment 6
Table A1 6. Experiment 6 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information

29 National Hockey League games played on January 16th (11
games), January 17th (2 games), January 18th (13 games), and
January 19th (3 games) played in 2014.
January 16th, 2014
Predictions (Winner vs. Score + Winner) X Records (record info
vs. no records)
Wins, losses, goals scored, goals allowed

Figure A1 34. Experiment 6: Winner condition predictions (with records).
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Figure A1 35. Experiment 6: Score + Winner condition predictions (with records).
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Figure A1 36. Experiment 6: Winner condition predictions (without records).

Figure A1 37. Experiment 6: Score + Winner condition predictions (without records).
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Experiment 7
Table A1 7. Experiment 7 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

45 Major League Baseball games played on May 2nd (15 games),
May 3rd (15 games), and May 4th (15 games) in 2014.
May 2nd, 2014
Winner vs. Score + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅
⋅

Base rates
How difficult was the survey to understand

⋅

After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times the home team
would win if they played that exact game 100 times.

Figure A1 38. Experiment 7: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 39. Experiment 7: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 40. Experiment 7: Base rates instructions (all conditions).

Figure A1 41. Experiment 7: Base rates (all conditions).
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Experiment 8
This experiment is a replication of Experiment 4 with changes in the display format
and two additional sets of measures after the predictions.

Table A1 8. Experiment 8 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

44 Major League Baseball games played on May 5th (13 games),
May 6th (15 games), and May 7th (16 games) in 2014.
May 5th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner, Hits + Winner, Runs + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅
⋅

Outcome variability
Outcome usefulness for predicting the winner

Figure A1 42. Experiment 8: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 43. Experiment 8: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 44. Experiment 8: Hits + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 45. Experiment 8: Runs + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment 9
The format of this experiment is an exact replication of Experiment 7, with the
exception that the question about how difficult the survey was to understand was changed
to “how confusing were the instructions”.

Table A1 9. Experiment 9 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

41 Major League Baseball games played on June 3rd (15 games),
June 4th (15 games), and June 5th (11 games) in 2014.
June 3rd, 2014
Winner vs. Score + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅
⋅

Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey

⋅

After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times the home team
would win if they played that exact game 100 times.
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Experiment 10
The format of this experiment is an exact replication of Experiment 8.

Table A1 10. Experiment 10 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

44 Major League Baseball games played on June 6th (14 games),
June 7th (15 games), and June 8th (15 games) in 2014.
June 6th, 2014.
Winner, Score + Winner, Hits + Winner, Runs + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅
⋅

outcome variability
outcome usefulness for predicting the winner

Experiment 11
The format of this experiment is an exact replication of Experiments 7 and 9.

Table A1 11. Experiment 11 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

42 Major League Baseball games played on June 9th (12 games),
June 10th (15 games), and June 11th (15 games) in 2014.
June 9th, 2014
Winner vs. Score + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅
⋅

Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey

⋅

After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times the home team
would win if they played that exact game 100 times.
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Experiment 12
Table A1 12. Experiment 12 design.

Predictions

Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

48 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
2014 World Cup Group Stage matches played on June 12th to
June 15th (11 games), June 16th to June 19th (12 games), June
20th to June 23rd (13 games), and June 24th to June 26th (12
games).
June 11th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner
Wins, losses, probable pitchers
⋅

Team liking ratings

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Each page spans multiple days; 4 pages of predictions total.
There are no “home” and “visiting” team designations.
No team records were given.
Participants were permitted to enter tied scores and to choose
“Draw” for the game outcome.
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Figure A1 46. Experiment 12: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 47. Experiment 12: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment 13
Table A1 13. Experiment 13 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

32 National Basketball Association games played on November
12th (8 games), November 13th (4 games), November 14th (10
games), and November 15th (10 games).
November 12th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner
Wins, losses
•

Prediction strategy

•

How carefully they thought about their predictions
How much effort they invested in making their predictions

•

⋅

Other deviations
from the example
format

⋅
⋅

Participants first made 16 predictions about games that were
worth 5 cents for correct winning team predictions, then
answered self-report measures for those 16 games, then
made an additional 16 predictions about games that were
worth 25 cents for correct winning team predictions, then
answered self-report measures for those 16 games.
Before each set of 16 predictions, participants had to pass a
comprehension check indicating how much they would get
paid for each correct prediction.
Which games were worth the 5 cent bonus and 25 cent bonus
was randomized between subjects. Half of the games on each
day were assigned to be either 5-cent or 25-cent games, and
so each page only displayed half of the days’ games since 5cent games and 25-cent games were predicted separately.
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Figure A1 48. Experiment 13: Winner condition instructions (small bonus).

Figure A1 49. Experiment 13: Winner condition predictions (small bonus).

95

Figure A1 50. Experiment 13: Winner condition instructions (large bonus).

Figure A1 51. Experiment 13: Winner condition predictions (large bonus).
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Figure A1 52. Experiment 13: Score + Winner condition instructions (small bonus).

Figure A1 53. Experiment 13: Score + Winner condition predictions (small bonus).
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Figure A1 54. Experiment 13: Score + Winner condition instructions (large bonus).

Figure A1 55. Experiment 13: Score + Winner condition predictions (large bonus).
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Experiment 14
Experiment 14 was a replication of Experiment 13 in the domain of hockey. The only
difference in the design is that we added the base rates task to the end of the survey.
Table A1 14. Experiment 14 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

32 National Hockey League games played on November 20th (12
games), November 21st (4 games), November 22nd (12 games),
and November 23rd (4 games).
November 20th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner
Wins, losses (with regulation losses and overtime losses
displayed separately)
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅

Base rates
How carefully they thought about their predictions
How much effort they invested in making their predictions
How confusing were the instructions in the survey
Participants first made 16 predictions about games that were
worth 5 cents for correct winning team predictions, then
answered self-report measures for those 16 games, then
made an additional 16 predictions about games that were
worth 25 cents for correct winning team predictions, then
answered self-report measures for those 16 games.
Before each set of 16 predictions, participants had to pass a
comprehension check indicating how much they would get
paid for each correct prediction.
Which games were worth the 5 cent bonus and 25 cent bonus
was randomized between subjects. Half of the games on each
day were assigned to be either 5-cent or 25-cent games, and
so each page only displayed half of the days’ games since 5cent games and 25-cent games were predicted separately.
Participants in all conditions revisited each game and said
how many times the home team would win if they were to
play that exact game 100 times.

⋅
Other deviations
from the example
format

⋅

⋅
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Experiment 15
Table A1 15. Experiment 15 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

32 National Basketball Association games played on December
10th (10 games), December 11th (2 games), December 12th (12
games), and December 13th (8 games).
December 10th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner, Free Throws + Winner, Temperature +
Winner
Wins, losses
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅

Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey

⋅

⋅
⋅

Participants were paid 60 cents for completing the study.
After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times each team
would win if they were to play that exact game 100 times.
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Figure A1 56. Experiment 15: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 57. Experiment 15: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 58. Experiment 15: Free Throws + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 59. Experiment 15: Free Throws + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 60. Experiment 15: Temperature + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 61. Experiment 15: Temperature + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment 16
Table A1 16. Experiment 16 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

30 National Hockey League games played on December 11th (10
games), December 12th (4 games), December 13th (13 games),
and December 14th (3 games).
December 11th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner, Saves + Winner, Temperature +
Winner
Wins, losses
⋅

Prediction strategy

⋅

Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey

⋅

⋅
⋅

Participants were paid 75 cents for completing the study.
After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times each team
would win if they were to play that exact game 100 times.
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Figure A1 62. Experiment 16: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 63. Experiment 16: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 64. Experiment 16: Saves + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 65. Experiment 16: Saves + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 66. Experiment 16: Crowd + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 67. Experiment 16: Crowd + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 68. Experiment 16: Base rates (all conditions).
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Experiment 17
Table A1 17. Experiment 17 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

31 National Hockey League games played on January 17th (12
games), January 18th (4 games), January 19th (7 games), and
January 20th (8 games).
January 17th, 2015
Winner, Score + Winner, Temperature + Winner, July 4th +
Winner
Wins, losses
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅
⋅

Prediction strategy
Global and local considerations
“This Time” and “Usually” considerations
Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey
Participants were paid 75 cents for completing the study.
Each prediction was displayed on its own page individually
instead of grouping predictions by day.
After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times each team
would win if they were to play that exact game 100 times.

Figure A1 69. Experiment 17: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 70. Experiment 17: Score + Winner condition predictions.

Figure A1 71. Experiment 17: Temperature + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 72. Experiment 17: July 4th + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 73. Experiment 17: July 4th + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 74. Experiment 17: Base rates (all conditions).
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Experiment 18
Experiment 18 is an exact replication of Experiment 17 except using NBA games
instead of NHL games.

Table A1 18. Experiment 18 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

27 National Basketball Association games played on January
19th (9 games), January 20th (2 games), January 21st (12 games),
and January 22nd (4 games).
January 19th, 2015
Winner, Score + Winner, Temperature + Winner, July 4th +
Winner
Wins, losses
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅
⋅

Prediction strategy
Global and local considerations
“This Time” and “Usually” considerations
Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey
Participants were paid 75 cents for completing the study.
Each prediction was displayed on its’ own page individually
instead of grouping by day.
After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times each team
would win if they were to play that exact game 100 times.
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Experiment 19
Table A1 19. Experiment 19 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Measures NOT in
the example that
ARE included in
this experiment

31 National Hockey League games played on January 29th (11
games), January 30th (5 games), January 31st (11 games), and
February 1st (4 games).
January 19th, 2015
Winner, Score + Winner
Wins, losses
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅

Other deviations
from the example
format

⋅
⋅
⋅

Prediction strategy
Global and local considerations
“This Time” and “Usually” considerations
Base rates
How confusing were the instructions in the survey
Each prediction was displayed on its’ own page individually
instead of grouping by day.
Participants were told at the beginning of the survey that
some games would be worth 5-cents and some games would
be worth 20-cents for correct winner predictions. Before
making any predictions, they had to pass a comprehension
check to show they understood the bonus scheme.
The 5-cent games and 20-cent games alternated and which
games were worth the 5 cents and which were worth 20 cents
was randomized between subjects.
Participants gave self-report measures (e.g., motivation and
confidence) separately for the 5-cent and 20-cent games.
After making their predictions, participants in all conditions
revisited each game and said how many times each team
would win if they were to play that exact game 100 times.
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Figure A1 75. Experiment 19: Bonus instructions.

Figure A1 76. Experiment 19: Winner condition predictions (small bonus).
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Figure A1 77. Experiment 19: Winner condition predictions (large bonus).

Figure A1 78. Experiment 19: Score + Winner condition predictions (small bonus).
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Figure A1 79. Experiment 19: Score + Winner condition predictions (large bonus).

Figure A1 80. Experiment 19: Base rates (all conditions).
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Excluded Experiments
We also ran 8 additional experiments in which we gave participants each team’s
“Points Scored” (the total number of points scored by that team so far that season) and
“Points Allowed" (the total number of points scored against that team so far that season)
for football and hockey games, and each team’s “Average Points Scored” (the average
number of points scored by that team per game so far that season) and “Average Points
Allowed" (the average number of points scored against that team per game so far that
season) for basketball games. However, we chose not to include these experiments in the
main analyses because we were worried that differences between prediction conditions in
these studies (namely, between Winner and Score + Winner) may have arisen because
people who are asked about winners only look at the win/loss records and people who are
asked about scores only look at the points scored or average points scored data. It should
be noted that the effects we report are stronger when we include the data from these 8
experiments.
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Experiment E1
Table A1 20. Experiment E1 design.
Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

14 National Football League games played on September 29th
(13 games) and September 30th (1 game) in 2013.
September 27th, 2013
Winner, Score + Winner, Points + Winner
Wins, losses, points scored, points allowed
⋅
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.

⋅

All games were displayed on a single page

Figure A1 81. Experiment E1: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 82. Experiment E1: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 83. Experiment E1: Points + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 84. Experiment E1: Points + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment E2
The format of this experiment is an exact replication of Experiment E1.

Table A1 21. Experiment E2 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

13 National Football League games played on October 24th (1
game), October 27th (11 games), and October 28th (1 game) in
2013.
October 24th, 2013
Winner, Score + Winner, Points + Winner
Wins, losses, points scored, points allowed
⋅
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.

⋅

All games were displayed on a single page

Experiment E3
The format of this experiment is an exact replication of Experiments E1 and E2.

Table A1 22. Experiment E3 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

13 National Football League games played on October 31st (1
game), November 3rd (11 games), November 4th (1 game) in
2013.
October 30th, 2013
Winner, Score + Winner, Points + Winner
Wins, losses, points scored, points allowed
⋅
⋅

⋅
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge
Which sports they are interested in being contacted about.
All games were displayed on a single page
Each of the 8 measured knowledge questions was displayed
on a separate page.
124

Experiment E4
In this experiment we manipulated the sport (basketball vs. hockey) between subjects.

Table A1 23. Experiment E4 design.

Predictions

Run Date
Conditions
Record information
Measures in the
example that are
NOT included in
this experiment
Other deviations
from the example
format

33 National Basketball Association games played on November
29th (13 games), November 30th (7 games), December 1st (8
games), and December 2nd (5 games) in 2013.
30 National Hockey League games played on November 29th (12
games), November 30th (11 games), December 1st (3 games),
December 2nd (4 games) in 2013.
November 26th, 2013
Predictions (Winner vs. Score + Winner) X Sport (NBA vs.
NHL)
Wins, losses, average points scored (NBA), average points
allowed (NBA), goals scored (NHL), goals allowed (NHL)
⋅

Self-reported following and knowledge.

⋅

Each of the 8 measured knowledge questions was displayed
on a separate page.
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Figure A1 85. Experiment E4: Winner condition predictions (NBA).
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Figure A1 86. Experiment E4: Score + Winner condition predictions (NBA).
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Figure A1 87. Experiment E4: Winner condition predictions (NHL).
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Figure A1 88. Experiment E4: Score + Winner condition predictions (NHL).
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Experiment E5
Table A1 24. Experiment E5 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information

32 National Hockey League games played on December 27th (10
games), December 28th (8 games), December 29th (10 games),
and December 30th (4 games) in 2013.
December 26th, 2013
Winner, Score + Winner, Crowd + Winner
Wins, losses, goals scored, goals allowed

Figure A1 89. Experiment E5: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 90. Experiment E5: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 91. Experiment E5: Crowd + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 92. Experiment E5: Crowd + Winner condition predictions.
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Experiment E6
Table A1 25. Experiment E6 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information

26 National Hockey League games played on February 6th (11
games), February 7th (5 games), and February 8th (10 games) in
2014.
February 6th, 2014
Predictions (Winner vs. Score + Winner) X
No majority winner prediction vs. Majority winner prediction
Wins, losses, goals scored, goals allowed

Figure A1 93. Experiment E6: Winner condition predictions (no majority winner
prediction).
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Figure A1 94. Experiment E6: Score + Winner condition predictions (no majority winner
prediction).
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Figure A1 95. Experiment E6: Winner condition instructions (with majority winner
prediction).

135

Figure A1 96. Experiment E6: Winner condition predictions (with majority winner
prediction).
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Figure A1 97. Experiment E6: Score + Winner condition instructions (with majority
winner prediction).
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Figure A1 98. Experiment E6: Score + Winner condition predictions (with majority
winner prediction).
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Experiment E7
Table A1 26. Experiment E7 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information

33 National Basketball Association games played on February
18th (9 games), February 19th (11 games), February 20th (3
games), and February 21st (10 games) in 2014.
February 18th, 2014
Predictions (Winner vs. Score + Winner) X
No majority winner prediction vs. Majority winner prediction
Wins, losses, average points scored, average points allowed

Figure A1 99. Experiment E7: Winner condition predictions (no majority winner
prediction).
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Figure A1 100. Experiment E7: Score + Winner condition predictions (no majority
winner prediction).
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Figure A1 101. Experiment E7: Winner condition predictions (with majority winner
prediction).
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Figure A1 102. Experiment E7: Score + Winner condition (with majority winner
prediction).

142

Experiment E8
Table A1 27. Experiment E8 design.

Predictions
Run Date
Conditions
Record information

32 National Basketball Association games played on March 14th
(10 games), March 15th (6 games), March 16th (9 games), and
March 17th (9 games) in 2014.
March 14th, 2014
Winner, Score + Winner, Free Throws + Winner, Temperature +
Winner
Wins, losses, average points scored, average points allowed

Figure A1 103. Experiment E8: Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 104. Experiment E8: Score + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 105. Experiment E8: Free Throws + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 106. Experiment E8: Free Throws + Winner condition predictions.
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Figure A1 107. Experiment E8: Temperature + Winner condition instructions.

Figure A1 108. Experiment E8: Temperature + Winner condition predictions.
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APPENDIX A2: ADDITIONAL MEASURES
All additional measures were collected after participants made all of their predictions.
The additional measures are reported in the order that they appeared in the corresponding
experiments. Not all measures appeared in all experiments.
To account for both observed and unobserved differences between experiments, the
means for each variable we report are mean-centered by experiment and added to the
overall average for that measure across all experiments and conditions. All correlations
are also based on these mean-centered values. Significance tests are based on fixedeffects linear models.
Finally, the analyses reported in this document are only based on data from the 19
experiments included in the paper. Furthermore, in all instances a participant’s
“prediction quality” is defined as the percentage of games where they predicted that the
team favored by well-calibrated markets would win (see the “Prediction Quality” section
of the main paper for more details).

Winning team probabilities / base rates (Experiments 7, 9, 11, 14-19)
On a separate page, immediately after making their predictions for all games,
participants were given instructions informing them that they will be asked to report how
likely each team was to win each game. Then on the following pages they were asked to
imagine for each game that the two teams played that exact same game 100 times and to
indicate how many times each team would win.
We included these questions because we wanted to explore whether people were
thinking that the upcoming games would be different from games in the past (e.g., “I
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know that the Braves usually beat the Pirates, but I think this time will be different and
the Pirates will win.”). If making detailed predictions changed people’s beliefs about
which teams were typically more likely to win, then doing so should affect their winning
team probabilities as well as their predictions. If, however, making detailed predictions
make people more likely to believe that the upcoming games would somehow be unique
and that “this time will be different”, their winning team probabilities should be
unchanged.
In Experiments 7, 9, 11, and 14-15, participants gave their win probabilities by
entering how many times out of 100 the home team would win. In Experiments 16-19
they gave their probabilities by entering how many times out of 100 both teams would
win (and the numbers were required to sum to 100).

Figure A2 1. Winning team probability instructions.
In this portion of the survey, you will see the same [X] [sports league] games
scheduled to be played from today, Thursday January 29th through Sunday February
1st.
For each game, we will ask you to imagine that the two teams played that exact
game 100 times.
What we mean by "that exact game" is that each of the 100 times the game is played,
the game would begin with the exact same starting conditions as the actual game.
For example, the location of the game, the home team, the win/loss records of each
team, the player lineup, player injuries, etc. would all be the same at the beginning of
each of the 100 games as they are at the beginning of the actual game.
For each game, we will ask you to tell us how many times you think [the home team /
each team] would win if they played that exact game 100 times.
Note. “X” is the number of games they made predictions for in the experiment and “sports league” is the
sport league of the games (e.g., Major League Baseball).
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Then, on the next few pages, participants revisited each game and reported how may
times out of 100 they thought each team would win if they were to play that exact game
100 times.

Figure A2 2. Winning team probability question format (Experiments 7, 9, 11, and 14-15).
Imagine these two teams played this exact game 100 times.
How many games (out of 100)
do you think the [home team]
would win?

Figure A2 3. Winning team probability question format (Experiments 16-19).
Imagine these two teams played this exact game 100 times.
How many games (out of 100) would the [visiting team] win?
How many games (out of 100) would the [home team] win?

Quality of winning team probabilities. Each winning team probability can be coded as
either agreeing with the wise prediction (i.e., they said the market favorite would win
more than 50 out of 100 games) or disagreeing with the wise prediction. Then we can
compare the average percentage of winning team probabilities that agreed with the
market favorites across prediction conditions to see if making detailed predictions
changed people’s beliefs about whether the market favorite was likely to win.
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Table A2 1. Average % of winning team probabilities that agreed with the market favorite.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

72.2%
(.108)

71.8%
(.113)

71.5%
(.114)

71.8%
(.124)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Consistency of winning team probabilities with predictions. Each winning team
probability can be coded as either consistent with the participants’ own predictions (i.e.,
they said that the team they predicted to win the actual game would more than 50 out of
100 games) or inconsistent. Then we can compare the average percentage of consistent
predictions across prediction conditions to see if making detailed predictions made
people more likely to deviate from their own beliefs about which teams were more likely
to win.

Table A2 2. Average % of winning team probabilities that were consistent with the
participants' own predictions.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

82.3%a
(.162)

79.9%b
(.113)

79.5%b
(.114)

80.9%ab
(.124)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Prediction strategy (Experiments 3-6, 8, 10, 12)
On a separate page, immediately after making their predictions for each game,
participants described the strategies they used to make their predictions in an open-ended
format. Participants were required to enter a minimum of 25 characters to proceed to the
next page of the survey.

Figure A2 4. Prediction strategy question format.
Briefly describe what strategies you used to make your
predictions:

In early studies, responses were read by the authors for exploratory purposes. None of
the prediction strategy responses for any experiments have been formally coded or
analyzed because we did not believe that participants would be aware of how the
manipulations affected their thought processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).

“Global” and “local” considerations (Experiments 1-16, E1-E8)
On a separate page, participants rated how much they considered each of several
factors when making their predictions on a scale from 1 to 7 (see labels below). The
display order of these items was randomized between subjects.
We used the exact “global” considerations (items 1-3 below, α = .68) and “local”
considerations (items 4-6 below, α = .85) from Yoon et al. (2013). Yoon and colleagues
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describe “global” information as “comprehensive data that indicate the overall
circumstances of the issue (e.g., past performance of two teams)”, and “local”
information as information that “although more specific and detailed, reveals only partial
information and is therefore less informative about the overall picture of the event (e.g.,
the offense ability of two teams)” (p. 5). For experiments that used baseball predictions,
we added a fourth “local” consideration specific to baseball (item 7) that did not appear
in Yoon et al. (2013).

Figure A2 5. "Global" and "local" considerations question format.
Please indicate the degree to which you considered each of these factors while
making your predictions:
not
considered
at all
overall impression
of the two teams
overall
performance of the
two teams in the
past years
overall
performance of the
two teams in recent
years
the teams’
offensive abilities
the teams’
defensive abilities
the teams’
coaching abilities
the teams’ pitching
abilities [baseball
only]

seriously
considered

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O
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Table A2 3. Means and standard deviations of "global" and "local" considerations.

Winner

Score†

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

overall impression of the two
teams

5.45a
(1.47)

5.55b
(1.40)

5.54ab
(1.45)

5.51ab
(1.43)

overall performance of the two
teams in the past years

4.53
(1.84)

4.46
(1.83)

4.44
(1.86)

4.49
(1.79)

overall performance of the two
teams in recent years

4.89
(1.77)

4.84
(1.74)

4.84
(1.77)

4.83
(1.69)

Global considerations

4.95
(1.34)

4.95
(1.30)

4.94
(1.31)

4.94
(1.27)

the teams’ offensive abilities

4.47a
(1.82)

4.70b
(1.78)

4.70b
(1.76)

4.60ab
(1.72)

the teams’ defensive abilities

3.98
(1.79)

4.06
(1.77)

4.11
(1.75)

4.13
(1.70)

the teams’ coaching abilities

3.41
(1.76)

3.35
(1.74)

3.35
(1.72)

3.49
(1.75)

the teams’ pitching abilities
[baseball only]

4.85
(1.96)

4.85
(1.89)

4.87
(1.96)

5.15
(1.88)

Local considerations

4.11
(1.57)

4.18
(1.51)

4.20
(1.49)

4.22
(1.53)

Note. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the final score. All means in the table are
mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row, means with different subscripts
are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons.
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Table A2 4. Correlations of "global" and "local" considerations with winning team
prediction quality.

Winner

Score†

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

.06***

.12***

.03

.10*

overall performance of the two
teams in the past years

-.04*

.00

-.11***

-.11*

overall performance of the two
teams in recent years

.01

.04*

-.04

.01

Global considerations

.01

.06***

-.06*

-.01

the teams’ offensive abilities

.05**

.11***

.04

.09*

the teams’ defensive abilities

-.01

.00

-.08**

.04

the teams’ coaching abilities

-.07***

-.06***

-.11***

-.01

the teams’ pitching abilities
[baseball only]

.16***

.13***

.12***

.07

.02

.05**

-.02

.05

overall impression of the two
teams

Local considerations

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score.

“This time” vs. “usually” considerations (Experiments 17-19)
In the last three experiments, instead of asking about “local” and “global” factors, we
asked participants several questions designed to identify whether they were thinking of
the upcoming games as unique or distinct from games in the past. They rated how much
they thought about past performance (items 1, 3, and 5) and how much they thought
about expected future performance (items 2, 4, and 6) on a scale from 1 to 7 (see labels
below).
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Figure A2 6. "This time" and "usually" considerations question format.
Please indicate the degree to which you considered each of these factors while
making your predictions:
not
considered
at all
The overall
performance of the
two teams so far this
season
Whether I expected
either team to
perform better or
worse that game
than they usually do
The typical quality of
the teams’ offenses
How the teams’
offensive lineups will
look that game
The typical quality of
the teams’ defenses
How the teams’
defensive lineups
will look that game.

seriously
considered

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

O
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Table A2 5. Means and standard deviations of "this time" and "usually" considerations.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

The overall performance of the two teams so
far this season

6.15
(1.07)

6.02
(1.20)

6.15
(1.07)

Whether I expected either team to perform
better or worse that game than they usually do

4.58
(1.58)

4.60
(1.61)

4.58
(1.58)

The typical quality of the teams’ offenses

4.61
(1.62)

4.75
(1.63)

4.61
(1.62)

How the teams’ offensive lineups will look
that game

3.98
(1.75)

4.08
(1.75)

3.98
(1.75)

The typical quality of the teams’ defenses

4.42
(1.65)

4.61
(1.65)

4.42
(1.65)

How the teams’ defensive lineups will look
that game.

3.92
(1.74)

4.03
(1.73)

3.92
(1.74)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.

Table A2 6. Correlations of "this time" and "usually" considerations with winning team
prediction quality.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

.13***

.23***

.31***

-.11**

-.11**

-.12***

-.07.

-.03

-.05

How the teams’ offensive lineups will look
that game

-.13***

-.11**

-.11**

The typical quality of the teams’ defenses

-.09*

-.10*

-.10**

-.14***

-.13***

-.15***

The overall performance of the two teams so
far this season
Whether I expected either team to perform
better or worse that game than they usually do
The typical quality of the teams’ offenses

How the teams’ defensive lineups will look
that game.
†

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the score.
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Confidence and motivation (Experiments 3-19, E1-E8)
On a separate page, participants rated both how confident they were in their
predictions and how motivated they were to make accurate predictions on scales from 1
to 7 (see labels below). They made these ratings for each type of prediction they made;
for example, participants in the Score + Winner condition would rate their confidence and
motivation for both their final score predictions and their winning team predictions. For
each type of prediction, the motivation question was always immediately followed the
confidence question. For participants who made detailed predictions, they rated the
motivation and confidence for the detailed predictions before the winning team
predictions (i.e., the same order that they made the predictions in the survey). All
confidence and motivation questions for all predictions were displayed on a single page.

Figure A2 7. Confidence and motivation question format.
Overall, how confident were you in the [outcome] predictions that you made?
not at all
confident
O

extremely
confident
O

O

O

O

O

O

Overall, how motivated were you to correctly predict the [outcome] for each game?
not at all
motivated
O

O

O

O

O

O

extremely
motivated
O

Note. For confidence questions, [outcome] was replaced with the appropriate prediction type for the
participant’s condition assignment: {“final score”, “hits”, “total runs”, “game time”, “total points”,
“predictions you made about the % of U.S. citizens in the crowd”, “free throw”, “temperature”, “winning
team”}. For the motivation questions, [outcome] was replaced with the appropriate prediction type for the
participant’s condition assignment: {“final score”, “number of hits each team will get”, “total number of
runs scored”, “total game time”, “total points scored”, “% of U.S. citizens in the crowd”, “number of free
throws each team will attempt”, “temperature outside the arena at the start of each game”, “winning team”}.
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Table A2 7. Means and standard deviations of confidence and motivation.

Winner

Score†

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

confidence in winner
prediction

4.83
(1.15)

4.82
(1.33)

4.90
(1.24)

4.79
(1.19)

confidence in detailed
prediction

-

3.84a
(1.50)

3.67b
(1.52)

3.81a
(1.53)

motivation to correctly
predict winner

6.11a
(1.07)

6.01b
(1.16)

6.09ab
(1.15)

6.03ab
(1.04)

motivation to correctly
predict detail

-

5.16a
(1.63)

4.91b
(1.76)

4.87b
(1.73)

Note. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the final score. All means in the table are
mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row, means with different subscripts
are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons.

Table A2 8. Correlations of confidence and motivation with winning team prediction
quality.

Winner

Score

Relevant
+ Winner

confidence in winner
prediction

.11***

.15***

.09***

.16***

confidence in detailed
prediction

-

-.01

-.03

-.04

motivation to correctly
predict winner

.15***

.20***

.19***

.20***

motivation to correctly
predict detail

-

.05**

.02

-.05

†

Irrelevant
+ Winner

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score.
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Thinking carefully and effortfully (Experiments 13, 14, 19)
These questions were included in three experiments where we manipulated the
incentives for correct predictions within-subjects for different games. The ordering and
format of these questions differed between Experiments 13-14 and Experiment 19.
In Experiments 13 and 14, we first informed participants that they would be rewarded
a 5-cent bonus each time they correctly predicted the winning team. After making sixteen
predictions, they reported “Overall, how carefully did you think about each game before
making your winning team predictions?” and “Overall, how much effort did you invest in
thinking about and making your predictions?” We then informed them that the amount of
the bonus had been increased to 25 cents per correct winning team prediction for a
remaining block of games. They then made predictions about an additional sixteen games
and rated how carefully they thought about and how much effort they invested in making
predictions for just those sixteen 25-cent games.
In Experiment 19, we informed participants at the beginning of the survey that some
games would be worth more than others. They then made all thirty low- and highincentive predictions at once. The amount of the bonus (5 cents vs. 20 cents) was
displayed prominently and alternated between games. After making all of their
predictions, they rated how carefully they thought about and how much effort they
invested in making their predictions separately for the 5-cent games and the 20-cent
games.
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Figure A2 8. Thinking carefully and effortfully question format.
Overall, how carefully did you think about [each game / each of the 5 cent games /
each of the 20 cent games] before making your winning team predictions?
not at all
carefully
O

extremely
carefully
O

O

O

O

O

O

Overall, how much effort did you invest in thinking about and making your predictions
[for the 5 cent games / for the 20 cent games]?
extreme
amounts of
effort
O

no effort
at all
O

O

O

O

O

O

Table A2 9. Means and standard deviations of careful and effortful thinking.
Winner

Score + Winner

careful (small incentive games)

5.47
(1.30)

5.45
(1.29)

careful (large incentive games)

5.84
(1.20)

5.83
(1.19)

effort (small incentive games)

5.41
(1.32)

5.53
(1.25)

effort (large incentive games)

5.78
(1.20)

5.86
(1.17)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
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Table A2 10. Correlations of careful and effortful thinking with winning team prediction
quality.
Winner

Score + Winner

careful (small incentive games)

.04

.14***

careful (large incentive games)

.06

.14***

effort (small incentive games)

.01

.11**

effort (large incentive games)

.02

.16***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Outcome variability (Experiments 8, 10)
On a separate page, participants were first asked to imagine that two teams played
two games with the exact same starting conditions (players, location, weather, etc.). Then
they were asked to rate how likely each type of outcome was to be different in the second
game than in the first game on scales from 1 to 7 (see labels below). They made these
ratings for each type of outcome they made predictions about; for example, participants
in the Hits + Winner condition first rated how likely the exact number of hits scored by
each team was to be different in the second game than in the first game, and then they
rated how likely the winning team was to be different in the second game than in the first
game.
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Figure A2 9. Outcome variability instructions.
In the following questions, we will ask you to imagine that two teams play each
other twice, and that both games have the exact same starting conditions. This
means that the teams, the stadium, team records, player lineups, starting pitchers,
player injuries, streaks, etc. would all be exactly the same at the start of both games.

Figure A2 10. Outcome variability question format.
If two teams played each other in two games with the exact same starting conditions,
how likely is it that the [outcome] of the first game would be different from the
[outcome] of the second game?
it would
definitely not
be different

very unlikely
to be
different

somewhat
unlikely
to be different

somewhat
likely
to be different

very likely
to be
different

it would
definitely
be different

O

O

O

O

O

O

Note. [Outcome] was replaced with the appropriate game outcome for the participant’s condition: {“exact
final score”, “exact number of hits per team”, “combined total number of runs scored”, “winning team”}.

Table A2 11. Means and standard deviations of outcome variability.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Hits
+ Winner

Runs
+ Winner

winner prediction variability

3.49
(0.903)

3.47
(0.810)

3.58
(0.845)

3.62
(0.849)

detailed prediction variability

-

4.43
(1.029)

4.46
(0.986)

4.54
(0.891)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 with Holm-Bonferroni-corrected
pairwise t-tests.

Table A2 12. Correlations of outcome variability with winning team prediction quality.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Hits
+ Winner

Runs
+ Winner

winner prediction variability

.01

-.10

-.02

.01

detailed prediction variability

-

.14*

.11*

.15**

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Outcome usefulness for predicting the winning team (Experiments 8, 10)
On the same page as the outcome variability questions, and after those questions,
participants were asked how useful the detailed outcome they made predictions about was
for predicting which team won the game on a scale from 1 to 5 (see labels below).
Participants in conditions that only made winning team predictions were not asked this
question.

Figure A2 11. Outcome usefulness for predicting the winning team question format.
Imagine you knew the [outcome] in a MLB baseball game. How much would this help
you predict who won that game?
completely
useless for
predicting the
winner

slightly useful
for predicting
the winner

moderately
useful for
predicting the
winner

extremely
useful for
predicting the
winner

I could tell with
certainty who
won the game

O

O

O

O

O

Note. [Outcome] was replaced with one of the following, depending on condition: {“exact number of runs
that each team scored (i.e. the final score)”, “exact number of hits that each team got”, “combined total
number of runs scored during the game”}. Rationally, the exact final score should always be rated 5, the
combined total number of runs scored during the game should always be rated 1, and the exact number of
hits each team got should be rated somewhere in-between.

Table A2 13. Means and standard deviations of outcome usefulness for predicting the
winning team.
Exact final score

Exact number of hits

Total number of runs

3.74a
(1.03)

3.40b
(0.79)

2.74c
(1.05)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 with Holm-Bonferroni-corrected
pairwise
t-tests.
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Table A2 14. Correlations of outcome usefulness for predicting the winning team with
winning team predictions quality.
Exact final score

Exact number of hits

Total number of runs

.01

.02

-.08

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Team liking (Experiment 12)
On a separate page, participants rated how much they disliked or liked each of the 32
teams that played in the 2014 FIFA World Cup on a 7-point scale from -3 to +3 (see
labels below). Teams were listed in alphabetical order and the scale labels repeated every
7 teams.

Figure A2 12. Team liking question format.
In general, how much do you like or dislike each team?
I very
I neither
I
I
much
like nor
I hate
somewhat
somewhat
dislike
dislike
this
dislike this
like this
this
this
team
team
team
team
team
Algeria
O
O
O
O
O

I very
much
like
this
team
O

I love
this
team
O

Argentina

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Australia

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

⁞

⁞

⁞

⁞

⁞

⁞

⁞

⁞

Uruguay

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Note. Participants gave liking ratings for all 32 teams in the 2014 FIFA World Cup: Algeria, Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador, England, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Iran, Italy, Japan, Korea
Republic, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay.
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Table A2 15. Means and standard deviations of liking ratings by country.
United States

England

Brazil

Spain

1.91
(1.27)

0.85
(1.23)

0.85
(1.31)

0.58
(1.14)

Germany

Argentina

Italy

Netherlands

0.55
(1.27)

0.49
(0.99)

0.46
(1.15)

0.41
(0.92)

Australia

Portugal

Switzerland

Japan

0.37
(0.88)

0.33
(0.99)

0.30
(0.79)

0.30
(1.03)

Belgium

Chile

France

Colombia

0.28
(0.80)

0.23
(0.85)

0.22
(1.17)

0.18
(0.86)

Uruguay

Mexico

Costa Rica

Ecuador

0.18
(0.80)

0.17
(1.26)

0.16
(0.81)

0.12
(0.79)

Greece

Korea Republic

Honduras

Cameroon

0.06
(0.83)

0.06
(0.97)

0.04
(0.75)

0.04
(0.79)

Côte d’Ivoire

Croatia

Nigeria

Bosnia-Herzegovina

0.03
(0.84)

0.03
(0.77)

0.01
(0.77)

-0.04
(0.73)

Algeria

Ghana

Russia

Iran

-0.10
(0.66)

-0.12
(1.04)

-0.20
(1.07)

-0.50
(1.05)

Note. Countries are listed in descending order by average liking rating.

The liking ratings for the different countries’ teams did not differ significantly
between conditions, so instead we present the average liking ratings by country in
descending

order.
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Effect of team liking on winning team predictions.
How much more participants liked one team versus the other was significantly
positively correlated with predicting that team to win the game, r(29182) = 0.26, p < .001.
However, there was no interaction between how much more participants liked the
superior team than the inferior team and whether or not they predicted the score on
winning team prediction quality.

Predicted the
Difference in liking
Predicted the score
superior team to win = (superior minus inferior team) X (Score+Winner condition)
values: {0, 1}
values: [-6, +6]
values: {0, 1}

Table A2 16. Effect of liking on winning team prediction quality.
Coefficients

Estimate

Std. Error

t value

Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept)

0.607

0.004

157.36

< 0.001

***

liking difference

0.096

0.003

32.79

< 0.001

***

predicted score

-0.032

0.006

-5.70

< 0.001

***

liking difference
x predicted score

-0.005

0.004

-1.31

0.19

Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Self-reported sports following and knowledge (Experiments 6-19, E5-E8)
On a separate page, participants rated how closely they followed the sport league used
in the experiment (e.g., Major League Baseball) and how knowledgeable they were about
that sport league on scales from 1 to 7 (see labels below).

Figure A2 13. Self-reported sports following and knowledge question format.
How closely do you follow [sport league]?
extremely
closely
O

not at all
O

O

O

O

O

O

How knowledgeable are you about [sport league]?
not at all
knowledgeable

extremely
knowledgeable

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Note. [Sport league] was replaced with the relevant sport for the experiment: {“MLB baseball”, “NFL
football”, “NHL hockey”, “NBA basketball”, “FIFA soccer”}

0.4
0.3

Histogram of self-reported
sports following

0.0

0.1

0.2

proportion of participan

0.4
0.1

0.2

0.3

Histogram of self-reported
sports knowledge

0.0

proportion of participan

Figure A2 14. Histograms of responses for self-reported sports knowledge and following.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

self-reported knowledge
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2

3

4

5

6

7

self-reported following

Table A2 17. Means and standard deviations of self-reported sports knowledge and
following.

Winner

Score +
Winner

Relevant +
Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

self-reported sports knowledge

4.62
(1.47)

4.60
(1.45)

4.60
(1.53)

4.56
(1.45)

self-reported sports following

4.62
(1.48)

4.58
(1.45)

4.60
(1.53)

4.56
(1.45)

Note. All means in the table are mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row,
means with different subscripts are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.

Table A2 18. Correlations of self-reported sports knowledge and following with winning
team prediction quality.

Winner

Score
+ Winner

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

self-reported sports knowledge

.15***

.17***

.13***

.11***

self-reported sports following

.15***

.16***

.15***

.13***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Measured knowledge (Experiments 1-19, E1-E8)
On a separate page, participants answered 8 questions designed to assess their
knowledge of the sport league used in the study. The display order of these questions was
randomized between participants. The questions used varied between experiments.
Participants were encouraged to leave the questions blank if they didn’t know the answer
rather than guessing the answer.
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Two of the eight questions were about which division a given sports team belonged to.
For each of these questions, participants were prompted to select the division that a given
team belonged to from a drop-down list containing all divisions in the sports league.
Major League Baseball has two major leagues with three divisions each for a total of six
divisions, the National Football League has two major conferences with four divisions
each for a total of eight divisions, the National Hockey League has two major
conferences with two divisions each for a total of four divisions, and the National
Basketball Association has two major conferences with three divisions each for a total of
six divisions. The two sports teams were chosen so that there was one from each of the
two major leagues/conferences. The teams used in these questions varied between
experiments.
Six of the eight questions asked about which teams relatively well-known players
played for. For each of these questions, participants were prompted to select the team that
a given player played for from a drop-down list containing all teams in the sports league.
For baseball and basketball, players were chosen so that there was one player from each
of the six different divisions in the league. For hockey, players were chosen so that there
was at least one player from each of the four different divisions, and the remaining two
players were drawn from teams from different conferences. For football, players were
chosen so that each player was from a different division and there were three players
from each conference. The players used in these questions varied between experiments.
For the 2014 FIFA World Cup (Experiment 12), all eight questions were about which
teams various players belonged to, and players were chosen at random from a list of the
top 25 well-known players in FIFA that were participating in the World Cup in 2014.
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Figure A2 15. Measured sports knowledge instructions.
In this section, we will ask you 8 questions designed to assess your [sports league]
knowledge. Please answer each of the following questions to the best of your ability.
Please do NOT look up the answers while completing this section. It is important for
us to have an accurate sense of your baseball knowledge. Your bonus payment
will not be affected by how you answer these questions.
If you do not know an answer, please leave it blank and move on to the next question.

Figure A2 16. Example of measured knowledge question format (team/division
matching).
In which division do the [sports team] play?

Figure A2 17. Example of measured knowledge question format (player/team matching).
Which MLB team does [player] play for?
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Figure A2 18. Histogram of measured knowledge scores.
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Unlike most self-reported measures, knowledge scores did not follow a normal
distribution. Rather, most participants scored either on the low end or the high end of the
range, and relatively few people in the middle of the range.

Table A2 19. Means and standard deviations of measured knowledge scores.

Winner

Score†

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

4.62
(2.86)

4.56
(2.85)

4.61
(2.96)

4.53
(2.73)

Note. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the final score. All means in the table are
mean-centered with experiment as the grouping factor. Within each row, means with different subscripts
are significantly different at p < .05 with pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons.
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Table A2 20. Correlations of measured sports knowledge with winning team prediction
quality.

Winner

Score†

Relevant
+ Winner

Irrelevant
+ Winner

.23***

.23***

.20***

.23***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. †Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score.

Maximizing Tendency Scale (Experiments 1-2)
This scale was included at the end of Experiments 1 and 2 on a separate page after all
other measures other than age, gender, and optional contact information. These questions
were included as a pilot for a separate research question, and so we will not discuss them
further.
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Figure A2 19. Maximizing Tendency Scale question format.
neither
agree
nor
disagree

completely
disagree

completely
agree

No matter what it
takes, I always try to
choose the best thing.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I don't like having to
settle for "good
enough".

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I am a maximizer.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

No matter what I do, I
have the highest
standards for myself.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I will wait for the best
option no matter how
long it takes.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I never settle for
second best.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I am uncomfortable
making decisions
before I know all of my
options. [Reversecoded]

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

Whenever I'm faced
with a choice, I try to
imagine what all the
other possibilities are,
even ones that aren't
present at the moment.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

I never settle.

O

O

O

O

O

O

O

neither
agree
nor
disagree

completely
disagree
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completely
agree

Gender and age (Experiments 1-19, E1-E8)
On a separate page, participants reported their gender and age.

Figure A2 20. Gender and age question format.
What is your gender?
O

Male

O

Female

How old are you?

Averages and correlations. Across all experiments, most participants were male
(73.2%) and an average of 30.9 years old (SD = 9.9). Being female was significantly
negatively correlated with making wise predictions, r(10,323) = -.07, p < .001, and age
was uncorrelated with wise predictions.

Instruction difficulty/confusion (Experiments 7, 9, 11, 14-19)
On same page as gender and age, after these questions, participants reported how
difficult the survey was to understand (Experiment 7) or how confusing the instructions
were (Experiments 9, 11, 14-19) on scales from 1 to 4 (see labels below). We included
this question in all experiments where participants reported winning team probabilities
because we were worried that some participants would be confused by the instructions to
imagine two teams playing the exact same game 100.
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Figure A2 21. Question difficulty question format (Experiment 7).
How difficult was this survey to understand?
not at all
difficult

slightly
difficult

moderately
difficult

extremely
difficult

O

O

O

O

Figure A2 22. Question difficulty question format (Experiments 9, 11, and 14-19).
How confusing were the instructions in this survey?
not at all
confusing

slightly
confusing

moderately
confusing

extremely
confusing

O

O

O

O

Table A2 21. Summary of responses to question difficulty.
not at all
[difficult/confusing]

slightly
[difficult/confusing]

moderately
[difficult/confusing]

extremely
[difficult/confusing]

N

4009

952

330

52

%

87.0%

10.3%

2.4%

0.3%

Across experiments, the vast majority of participants rated the survey to be “not at all
[difficult/confusing]”.
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Contact for future studies (Experiments 1-19, E1-E8)
On the same page as gender and age, after all other questions, participants were asked
whether they would like to be contacted to participate in future sports studies, and if so,
to give a contact e-mail address. We did not use the information collected in this section
to recruit for any experiments.

Figure A2 23. Contact for future studies sport selection.
Would you like to participate in future studies that allow you to win money by making
predictions about sports? If so, check the boxes for the sports you are interested in
and enter your email address in the box below:
□

Major League Baseball

□

National Basketball Association

□

National Football League

□

National Hockey League

□

Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) [Experiment 12 only]

Note. The checklist for different sports leagues was only used in Experiments 6-19 and E4-E8. For
Experiments 1-5 and E1-E3, participants were asked “Would you like to participate in future studies that
allow you to win money by making predictions about [Major League Baseball / the National Football
League]? If so, please enter your email address in the box below.” This statement was then followed by the
email entry box and privacy disclaimer displayed below.

Figure A2 24. Contact for future studies e-mail entry.
(If you enter your email address then University of Pennsylvania researchers may
occasionally email you links to surveys about the sports you selected. We will NEVER
share your email address with anyone).
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APPENDIX A3. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES
In this document, we report several alternative analyses for each of the main findings
reported in the Results section of the main text.

Definition of Prediction Quality
Our research investigates how making detailed predictions about sports affects
prediction quality. In the main text, we defined wise predictions as choosing the team
favored by betting markets. However, there are several possible ways to define a wise
prediction:
•

Odds: Choosing the team favored by well-calibrated betting markets (the
definition used in the main text).

•

Records: Choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of past games.

•

Accuracy: Choosing the team that actually won the game.

In the main text we explain why the best definition for a wise prediction is choosing
the team favored by well-calibrated betting markets (“Odds”), but in this Appendix we
reproduce the main results for all three definitions.

Level of Analysis
We also chose to analyze wise predictions in the main text at the game level,
examining for each game whether a greater percentage of participants made wise
predictions when they were simply asked to select the winning team than when they were
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also (or instead) asked to make a detailed prediction. However, there are multiple ways
we could have analyzed wise predictions:
•

Game-Level Analysis: Treat each game as an observation and compare the
percentage of participants making wise predictions between different conditions
as within-subjects measures (the method used in the main text).

•

Participant-Level Analysis: Treat each participant as an observation and
compare the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in
different conditions.

•

Prediction-Level Analysis: Treat each prediction as an observation and compare
the percentage of wise predictions between conditions.

In the main text, we explain that using game as the level of analysis has the benefit of
controlling for differences across games, while also allowing us to explore whether
effects emerge for some games and not others. However, the other methods outlined
above are reported in this Appendix.

Summary of experimental results
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Table 1
in the main text displaying the percentage of wise predictions made in each condition in
each experiment.
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Table A3 1. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The average percentage of
participants making wise predictions in each prediction condition for each experiment.
Experiment

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

1

MLB

316

41

2

MLB

508

39

3

MLB

635

45

4

MLB

631

45

5

MLB

634

42

6

NHL

309

29

7

MLB

337

45

8

MLB

625

44

9

MLB

422

41

10

MLB

728

45

11

MLB

525

42

Wise
Prediction
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy

Winner
Only
67.3%a
69.5%a
53.5%
73.3%a
78.8%a
42.2%b
63.4%a
71.5%a
52.7%
70.8%a
76.9%a
51.9%
60.1%
78.9%ab
49.2%

Score
Only
61.4%b
65.1%b
52.4%
67.4%c
72.5%c
46.4%a
57.5%c
65.2%c
51.5%
-

Score
+Winner
69.7%b
75.0%b
44.2%ab
60.2%b
71.7%b
51.2%
66.6%b
72.2%c
49.8%
58.8%
76.8%b
48.5%

Relevant
+Winner
66.8%b
74.0%b
50.0%
58.8%
79.2%a
48.8%

Irrelevant
+Winner
60.2%
78.9%ab
48.3%

Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy

53.5%a
58.4%a
56.8%
56.6%a
73.1%a
47.2%
56.7%
73.6%a
51.8%
60.9%
73.4%
44.4%b
59.3%
77.4%a
54.4%
63.4%a
71.6%
46.6%

-

49.8%b
55.4%b
54.4%
53.9%b
70.4%b
47.2%
55.7%
71.2%b
51.6%
59.7%
74.0%
45.9%a
58.4%
75.2%b
54.7%
61.8%b
70.5%
46.8%

55.8%
71.4%b
51.1%
58.5%
76.3%ab
54.7%
-

-

(table continued on next page)
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Experiment

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

12

FIFA

622

48

13

NBA

420

32

14

NHL

541

32

15

NBA

775

32

Prediction
Quality
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy

Winner
Only
61.2%a
49.7%
70.3%
79.1%a
62.1%
70.0%
82.0%
55.4%
74.1%
86.2%a
60.2%

Score
Only
-

Score
+Winner
57.8%b
48.4%
70.9%
77.8%b
61.7%
70.8%
81.4%
55.9%
72.9%
84.6%b
60.7%

Relevant
+Winner
72.4%
83.7%b
60.2%

Irrelevant
+Winner
72.6%
83.4%b
59.4%

Odds
73.3%
72.4%
71.4%
73.0%
Records
81.6%ab
80.6%bc
78.0%d
79.3%cd
Accuracy
55.2%
54.6%
54.4%
55.9%
Odds
74.8%a
70.8%b
75.2%a
17
NHL
811
31
Records
83.6%a
80.3%b
83.4%a
Accuracy
53.8%
52.6%
53.4%
Odds
78.4%
76.5%
78.3%
Records
83.7%a
81.5%b
82.6%ab
18
NBA
828
30
Accuracy
68.5%
67.2%
68.8%
Odds
69.7%a
65.4%b
19
NHL
518
31
Records
79.4%
77.2%
Accuracy
50.0%
50.3%
Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions across games within
each condition for that experiment. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored
by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a
greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that
actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using withinsubjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979). The
percentages of wise predictions defined by records are not calculated for Experiment 12 because the FIFA
teams in the World Cup did not have comparable win/loss records. Experiment 3 manipulated whether the
Score + Winner condition was paid based on the accuracy of their score prediction or their winner
prediction; the Score + Winner column collapses across these two conditions. Experiments 4, 8, and 10
included two Relevant + Winner conditions, a condition in which participants first predicted total runs and
a condition in which participants first predicted each team’s hits; the Relevant + Winner column collapses
across these two conditions. The relevant predictions made in Experiments 5, 15, and 16 were total runs
scored, free throws attempted by each team, and saves made by each team, respectively. Experiments 17
and 18 included two Irrelevant + Winner conditions, a condition in which participants predicted the
temperature outside the indoor stadium at the start of the game and a condition where participants predicted
the high temperature in the game city on July 4th 2015 (about 6 months after the game); the Irrelevant +
Winner column collapses across these two conditions. The irrelevant predictions made in Experiments 5,
15 and 16 were total game time, temperature outside the stadium at game time, and percentage of U.S.
citizens in the crowd, respectively. FIFA = Fédération Internationale de Football Association; MLB =
Major League Baseball; NBA = National Basketball Association; NHL = National Hockey League.
16

NHL

711

30
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Table A3 2. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The average percentage of
wise predictions made by participants in each prediction condition for each experiment.
Experiment

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

1

MLB

316

41

2

MLB

508

39

3

MLB

635

45

4

MLB

631

45

5

MLB

634

42

6

NHL

309

29

7

MLB

337

45

8

MLB

625

44

9

MLB

422

41

10

MLB

728

45

11

MLB

525

42

Prediction
Quality
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

Winner
Only
67.2%a
69.5%a
53.5%
73.2%a
78.7%a

Score
Only
60.8%b
64.8%b
52.4%
67.6%b
72.5%b

Score
+Winner
69.5%b
74.7%b

Relevant
+Winner
-

Irrelevant
+Winner
-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

42.2%c
63.4%a
71.5%a
52.6%a
70.8%a
77.0%a

46.4%a
57.7%c
65.4%b
51.6%ab
-

44.2%b
60.2%b
71.7%a
51.2%b
66.6%b
72.2%b

66.7%b
74.1%ab

-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

51.8%
60.1%
78.9%
49.2%
53.5%a
58.4%a

-

49.8%
59.0%
77.1%
48.4%
49.6%b
55.2%b

50.0%
58.8%
79.2%
48.7%
-

60.1%
78.6%
48.1%
-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

56.8%a
56.5%a
73.1%
47.1%
56.8%
73.6%

-

54.2%b
53.6%b
70.5%
46.9%
55.8%
71.3%

56.2%
71.6%

-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy

51.8%
60.9%
73.4%
44.4%
59.4%
77.3%
54.4%

-

51.7%
59.7%
73.9%
45.6%
58.5%
75.1%
54.8%

51.0%
58.5%
76.2%
54.8%

-

Odds
Records
Accuracy

63.4%a
71.6%
46.6%

-

61.6%b
70.6%
47.0%

-

-

(table continued on next page)
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Experiment

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

12

FIFA

622

48

13

NBA

420

32

14

NHL

541

32

15

NBA

775

32

16

NHL

711

30

17

NHL

811

31

18

NBA

828

30

19

NHL

518

31

Prediction
Quality
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

Winner
Only
61.2%a
49.6%a
70.3%

Score
Only
-

Score
+Winner
57.7%b
48.4%b
70.7%

Relevant
+Winner
-

Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

79.2%
62.2%
69.9%
82.0%
55.3%
74.2%

Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

Irrelevant
+Winner
-

-

77.8%
61.6%
70.9%
81.2%
55.9%
72.9%

72.4%

72.7%

86.2%
60.3%
73.3%
81.6%
55.2%
74.9%a

-

84.6%
61.0%
72.2%
80.4%
54.7%
70.2%b

83.7%
60.4%
71.4%
78.0%
54.4%
-

83.4%
59.8%
73.0%
79.1%
56.0%
75.0%a

83.7%a
54.0%a
78.4%
83.7%
68.5%
69.7%a

-

79.9%b
52.4%b
76.5%
81.5%
67.2%
64.5%b

-

83.2%a
53.5%ab
78.2%
82.4%
68.8%
-

Records
79.4%a
76.4%b
Accuracy 49.9%
50.8%
Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
for that experiment. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting
markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater
percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually
won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using between-subjects
pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979). The
percentages of wise predictions defined by records are not calculated for Experiment 12 because the FIFA
teams in the World Cup did not have comparable win/loss records. Experiment 3 manipulated whether the
Score + Winner condition was paid based on the accuracy of their score prediction or their winner
prediction; the Score + Winner column collapses across these two conditions. Experiments 4, 8, and 10
included two Relevant + Winner conditions, a condition in which participants first predicted total runs and
a condition in which participants first predicted each team’s hits; the Relevant + Winner column collapses
across these two conditions. The relevant predictions made in Experiments 5, 15, and 16 were total runs
scored, free throws attempted by each team, and saves made by each team, respectively. Experiments 17
and 18 included two Irrelevant + Winner conditions, a condition in which participants predicted the
temperature outside the indoor stadium at the start of the game and a condition where participants predicted
the high temperature in the game city on July 4th 2015 (about 6 months after the game); the Irrelevant +
Winner column collapses across these two conditions. The irrelevant predictions made in Experiments 5,
15 and 16 were total game time, temperature outside the stadium at game time, and percentage of U.S.
citizens in the crowd, respectively. FIFA = Fédération Internationale de Football Association; MLB =
Major League Baseball; NBA = National Basketball Association; NHL = National Hockey League.
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Table A3 3. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The percentage of wise
predictions made in each prediction condition for each experiment.
Exp
#

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

1

MLB

316

41

2

MLB

508

39

3

MLB

635

45

4

MLB

631

45

5

MLB

634

42

6

NHL

309

29

7

MLB

337

45

8

MLB

625

44

9

MLB

422

41

10

MLB

728

45

11

MLB

525

42

Prediction
Quality
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

Winner
Only
67.3%a
69.5%a
53.5%
73.3%a
78.8%a

Score
Only
61.4%b
65.1%b
52.4%
67.4%c
72.5%c

Score
+Winner
69.8%b
75.0%b

Relevant
+Winner
-

Irrelevant
+Winner
-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

42.2%c
63.4%a
71.6%a
52.7%
70.8%a
76.9%a

46.4%a
57.6%c
65.3%b
51.5%
-

44.3%b
60.2%b
71.8%a
51.1%
66.6%b
72.2%c

66.8%b
74.0%b

-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

51.9%a
60.2%
78.9%a
49.2%
53.5%a
58.4%a

-

49.8%b
58.8%
76.8%b
48.5%
49.8%b
55.4%b

50.0%b
58.8%
79.2%a
48.8%
-

60.2%
78.9%a
48.3%
-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records

56.8%a
56.6%a
73.1%a
47.2%
56.8%
73.6%a

-

54.3%b
53.9%b
70.4%b
47.1%
55.8%
71.2%b

56.0%
71.5%b

-

Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy

51.8%
60.9%
73.4%
44.4%
59.4%
77.4%a
54.5%

-

51.6%
59.8%
74.1%
45.8%
58.6%
75.2%b
54.8%

51.1%
58.6%
76.2%ab
54.8%

-

Odds
Records
Accuracy

63.4%a
71.6%
46.6%

-

61.8%b
70.5%
46.8%

-

-

(table continued on next page)
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Exp
#

Sport
League

# of
subjects

# of
games

12

FIFA

622

48

13

NBA

420

32

14

NHL

541

32

15

NBA

775

32

16

NHL

711

30

17

NHL

811

31

18

NBA

828

30

19

NHL

518

31

Prediction
Quality
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

Winner
Only
61.2%a
49.7%a
70.3%

Score
Only
-

Score
+Winner
57.8%b
48.4%b
70.9%

Relevant
+Winner
-

Irrelevant
+Winner
-

Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

79.1%
62.1%
70.0%
82.0%
55.4%
74.1%

-

77.8%
61.6%
70.8%
81.4%
56.0%
72.9%

72.4%

72.6%

Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

86.2%a
60.2%
73.3%
81.6%a
55.2%
74.8%a

-

84.6%ab
60.8%
72.4%
80.6%ab
54.6%
70.8%b

83.7%b
60.3%
71.4%
78.0%c
54.4%
-

83.4%b
59.5%
73.0%
79.2%bc
55.8%
75.1%a

Records
Accuracy
Odds
Records
Accuracy
Odds

83.6%a
53.8%
78.4%a
83.7%a
68.5%
69.7%a

-

80.3%b
52.6%
76.5%b
81.5%b
67.2%
65.4%b

-

83.4%a
53.4%
78.3%a
82.6%ab
68.8%
-

Records
79.4%a
77.2%b
Accuracy
50.0%
50.3%
Note. Each row shows the percentage of wise predictions made in each prediction condition for that
experiment. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets,
“Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of
games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game.
Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using pairwise proportion tests and the
Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979). The percentages of wise predictions
defined by records are not calculated for Experiment 12 because the FIFA teams in the World Cup did not
have comparable win/loss records. Experiment 3 manipulated whether the Score + Winner condition was
paid based on the accuracy of their score prediction or their winner prediction; the Score + Winner column
collapses across these two conditions. Experiments 4, 8, and 10 included two Relevant + Winner
conditions, a condition in which participants first predicted total runs and a condition in which participants
first predicted each team’s hits; the Relevant + Winner column collapses across these two conditions. The
relevant predictions made in Experiments 5, 15, and 16 were total runs scored, free throws attempted by
each team, and saves made by each team, respectively. Experiments 17 and 18 included two Irrelevant +
Winner conditions, a condition in which participants predicted the temperature outside the indoor stadium
at the start of the game and a condition where participants predicted the high temperature in the game city
on July 4th 2015 (about 6 months after the game); the Irrelevant + Winner column collapses across these
two conditions. The irrelevant predictions made in Experiments 5, 15 and 16 were total game time,
temperature outside the stadium at game time, and percentage of U.S. citizens in the crowd, respectively.
FIFA = Fédération Internationale de Football Association; MLB = Major League Baseball; NBA =
National Basketball Association; NHL = National Hockey League.
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Does predicting scores make winner predictions worse?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the result reported in the main
text that predicting scores in addition to predicting winning teams yields worse winning
team predictions than only predicting winning teams.

Table A3 4. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 2-19: The average percentage of
participants making wise predictions in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Odds

65.4%a

63.3%b

Records

75.9%a

74.2%b

Accuracy

52.3%

51.9%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included a Score + Winner condition. “Odds” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions
defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with
different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Table A3 5. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 2-19: The average percentage of
wise predictions made by participants in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Odds

67.1%a

64.9%b

Records

77.4%a

75.8%b

Accuracy

53.7%

53.4%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included a Score + Winner condition. To account for both observed
and unobserved differences between experiments, the means for each condition are mean-centered by
experiment and added to the overall average across all experiments and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions
defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with
different subscripts differ at p < .05 using between-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Table A3 6. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 2-19: The percentage of wise
predictions made in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Odds

66.2%a

64.1%b

Records

76.8%a

75.4%b

Accuracy

53.1%a

52.7%b

Note. Each row shows the percentage wise predictions made in each condition across all games in all
experiments that included a Score + Winner condition. To account for both observed and unobserved
differences between games, the means for each condition are mean-centered by game and added to the
overall average across all games and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that
had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using
within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm,
1979).
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Does predicting other event details make predictions worse?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Figure 3
in the main text showing that making other kinds of detailed predictions that are relevant
to the game also negatively affected prediction quality.

Table A3 7. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 16: The average
percentage of participants making wise predictions in the Winner, Score + Winner, and
Relevant + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Relevant + Winner

Odds

64.9%a

63.2%b

63.1%b

Records

78.6%a

76.1%b

6.6%b

Accuracy

53.4%

52.9%

52.8%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included a Relevant + Winner condition. “Odds” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions
defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with
different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Table A3 8. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 16: The average
percentage of wise predictions made by participants in the Winner, Score + Winner, and
Relevant + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Relevant + Winner

Odds

66.0%a

64.5%b

64.4%b

Records

79.4%a

77.1%b

77.4%b

Accuracy

54.1%

53.7%

53.5%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included a Relevant + Winner condition. To account for both
observed and unobserved differences between experiments, the means for each condition are meancentered by experiment and added to the overall average across all experiments and conditions. “Odds”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates
wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using between-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Table A3 9. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, and 16: The
percentage of wise predictions made in the Winner, Score + Winner, and Relevant +
Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Relevant + Winner

Odds

65.2%a

63.6%b

63.5%b

Records

78.8%a

76.4%c

76.9%b

Accuracy

53.7%

53.2%

53.1%

Note. Each row shows the percentage of wise predictions made in each condition across all games in all
experiments that included a Relevant + Winner condition. To account for both observed and unobserved
differences between games, the means for each condition are mean-centered by game and added to the
overall average across all games and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that
had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using
within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm,
1979).
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Are predictions worse because people pay less attention?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Figure 4
in the main text showing that making detailed prediction that are irrelevant to the game
did not affect prediction quality.

Table A3 10. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 5 and 15-18: The average percentage of
participants making wise predictions in the Winner, Score + Winner, and Irrelevant +
Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Irrelevant + Winner

Odds

71.2%a

69.4%b

71.0%a

Records

82.6%a

80.6%b

81.4%b

Accuracy

56.8%

56.1%

56.5%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included an Irrelevant + Winner condition. “Odds” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions
defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with
different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Table A3 11. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 5 and 15-18: The average
percentage of wise predictions made by participants in the Winner, Score + Winner, and
Irrelevant + Winner conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Irrelevant + Winner

Odds

72.7%a

70.6%b

72.4%a

Records

83.0%a

80.9%b

81.6%b

Accuracy

57.9%

57.2%

57.8%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
across all games in all experiments that included an Irrelevant + Winner condition. To account for both
observed and unobserved differences between experiments, the means for each condition are meancentered by experiment and added to the overall average across all experiments and conditions. “Odds”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates
wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using between-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Table A3 12. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 5 and 15-18: The percentage of
wise predictions made in the Winner, Score + Winner, and Irrelevant + Winner
conditions.

Prediction Quality

Winner Only

Score + Winner

Irrelevant + Winner

Odds

71.9%a

70.0%b

71.7%a

Records

82.8%a

80.8%c

81.7%b

Accuracy

57.4%

56.7%

57.2%

Note. Each row shows the percentage of making wise predictions made in each condition across all games
in all experiments that included an Irrelevant + Winner condition. To account for both observed and
unobserved differences between games, the means for each condition are mean-centered by game and
added to the overall average across all games and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as
choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as
choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p
< .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
(Holm, 1979).
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Are predictions worse because people think harder?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Figure 5
in the main text showing that incentivizing people to think harder about their predictions
did not negatively affect winning team prediction quality, although having them predict
scores did.

Table A3 13. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 13, 14, and 19: The average percentage
of participants making wise predictions in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions for
low- versus high-incentives.

Prediction
Quality

Winner Only
low incentive

Winner Only
high incentive

Score + Winner
low incentive

Score + Winner
high incentive

Odds

70.1%a

70.0%ab

68.7%c

69.2%bc

Records

79.2%b

80.7%a

77.7%c

79.3%b

Accuracy

55.9%ab

56.0%ab

56.4%a

55.5%b

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions in each condition
across all games in all experiments that varied incentives for accuracy within-subjects. “Odds” indicates
wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise
predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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Table A3 14. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 13, 14, and 19: The average
percentage of wise predictions made by participants in the Winner and Score + Winner
conditions for low- versus high-incentives.

Prediction
Quality

Winner Only
low incentive

Winner Only
high incentive

Score + Winner
low incentive

Score + Winner
high incentive

Odds

70.0%

69.7%

68.5%

68.7%

Records

79.4%

80.8%

78.0%

79.4%

Accuracy

55.3%

55.3%

56.0%

55.1%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
across all games in all experiments that varied incentives for accuracy within-subjects. To account for both
observed and unobserved differences between experiments, the means for each condition are meancentered by experiment and added to the overall average across all experiments and conditions. “Odds”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates
wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy”
indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row,
means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using between-subjects pairwise t-tests and the HolmBonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).

Table A3 15. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 13, 14, and 19: The percentage of
wise predictions made in the Winner and Score + Winner conditions for low- versus
high-incentives.

Prediction
Quality

Winner
low incentive

Winner
high incentive

Score + Winner
low incentive

Score + Winner
high incentive

Odds

70.0%

69.9%

68.8%

69.0%

Records

79.5%b

81.0%a

78.2%c

79.7%b

Accuracy

55.4%

55.6%

56.0%

55.3%

Note. Each row shows the percentage of making wise predictions made in each condition across all games
in all experiments that varied incentives for accuracy within-subjects. To account for both observed and
unobserved differences between games, the means for each condition are mean-centered by game and
added to the overall average across all games and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as
choosing the team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as
choosing the team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p
< .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons
(Holm, 1979).

192

Are predictions worse because people think less globally or more locally?
Only a single measure of overall global and local considerations was collected per
person, so these results cannot be analyzed at the game-level or prediction-level.

Do people who make detailed predictions use useful information less?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Tables 2
and 3 in the main text showing the weights given to win/loss records and home field in
winning team predictions.

Table A3 16. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: The change in the
percentage of participants in the Winner condition choosing the team to win based on
win/loss records and home field advantage.
Coefficients

Winner Only

better record

0.355 ***

home team

0.125 ***

| record difference |

-0.587 ***

better record * | record difference |

1.565 ***

home team * | record difference |

-0.451 ***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Weights are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression.
Because each game generates two observations (one for each team) standard errors are clustered by game.
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Table A3 17. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: The average
weights participants in the Winner condition gave to win/loss records and home field
advantage.
Coefficients

Winner Only

better record

0.170 ***

home team

0.136 ***

| record difference |

-3.302 ***

better record * | record difference |

2.522 ***

home team * | record difference |

-1.172 ***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Average marginal weights are estimated by using logistic
regressions to estimate marginal weights for each participant in each experiment and averaging marginal
weights across participants within conditions. Because each participant generates two observations per
prediction (one for each team) standard errors for each participant’s weights are clustered by participantgame.

Table A3 18. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: The weights
given to win/loss records and home field advantage in the Winner condition.
Coefficients

Winner Only

better record

0.265 ***

home team

0.153 ***

| record difference |

-1.544 ***

better record * | record difference |

3.418 ***

home team * | record difference |

-0.448 ***

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Marginal weights are estimated using logistic regression. Because
each prediction generates two observations (one for each team) standard errors are clustered by experimentparticipant-game.
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Table A3 19. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: Differences from
the Winner condition in the change in the percentage of participants choosing the team to
win based on win/loss records and home field advantage.
Score†

Coefficients

Relevant

Irrelevant
-0.002

better record

-0.058 ***

-0.029 ***

home team

-0.073 ***

-0.053 ***

0.032 **

| record difference |

-0.104 ***

-0.034

0.064 ***

better record * | record difference |

0.036

home team * | record difference |

0.181 ***

Number of participants in sample
Number of games in sample

-0.112 **
0.188 ***

-0.132 ***
0.004

5,537

1,958

1,541

644

235

162

†

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score. Weights are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression. Because each game generates
two observations (one for each team) standard errors are clustered by game.

Table A3 20. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: Differences
from the Winner condition in the average weights given to win/loss records and home
field advantage.
Score†

Coefficients

Relevant

Irrelevant

better record

-0.058 ***

-0.020

0.035

home team

-0.116 ***

-0.079 ***

0.037

| record difference |

0.149

better record * | record difference |

-0.677 **

home team * | record difference |

0.381 ***

Number of participants in sample
Number of games in sample

0.237

-0.033

-0.513

-0.419

0.036

0.448

5,537

1,958

1,541

644

235

162

†

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score. Average marginal weights are estimated by using logistic regressions to estimate marginal
weights for each participant in each experiment and averaging marginal weights across participants within
conditions. Because each participant generates two observations per prediction (one for each team)
standard errors for each participant’s weights are clustered by participant-game.
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Table A3 21. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-5, 7-11, and 13-19: Differences
from the Winner condition in the weights given to win/loss records and home field
advantage.
Score†

Coefficients

Relevant

Irrelevant

better record

-0.068 ***

-0.018

0.037 *

home team

-0.120 ***

-0.077 ***

0.056 **

| record difference |

-0.009

better record * | record difference |

-0.169 **

home team * | record difference |

0.231 ***

Number of participants in sample
Number of games in sample

0.221 *
-0.583 ***
0.180

0.281 ***
-0.583 ***
0.067

5,537

1,958

1,541

644

235

162

†

Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Score includes all conditions where participants predicted the
final score. Marginal weights are estimated using logistic regression. Because each prediction generates
two observations (one for each team) standard errors are clustered by experiment-participant-game.
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Which games will show the effect?
The tables in this section report alternative analyses for the data presented in Figure 8
in the main text showing that making relevant detailed predictions had a considerably
larger negative effect on prediction quality when both cues agreed (the home team had
the better record) than when they disagreed (the visiting team had the better record).

Table A3 22. Game-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The percentage of participants
making wise predictions by prediction condition and which team had the better record.
Visiting Team Has Better Record

Home Team Has Better Record

Prediction
Quality

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Odds

55.5%c

54.7%d

79.0%a

74.6%b

Records

72.4%c

72.8%c

81.4%a

76.4%b

Accuracy

51.3%

51.2%

54.4%

54.0%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of participants making wise predictions in each condition
across all games in all experiments. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team
favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had
won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using
within-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm,
1979).
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Table A3 23. Participant-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The average percentage of
wise predictions made by participants by prediction condition and which team had the
better record.
Visiting Team Has Better Record

Home Team Has Better Record

Prediction
Quality

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Odds

55.5%c

54.8%d

78.2%a

74.2%b

Records

73.1%c

73.6%c

80.7%a

75.9%b

Accuracy

51.2%

51.2%

54.0%

53.7%

Note. Each row shows the average percentage of wise predictions made by participants in each condition
across all games in all experiments. To account for both observed and unobserved differences between
experiments, the means for each condition are mean-centered by experiment and added to the overall
average across all experiments and conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team favored by betting markets, “Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that
had won a greater percentage of games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the
team that actually won the game. Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using
between-subjects pairwise t-tests and the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm,
1979).

Table A3 24. Prediction-Level Analyses. Experiments 1-19: The percentage of wise
predictions made by prediction condition and which team had the better record.
Visiting Team Has Better Record

Home Team Has Better Record

Prediction
Quality

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Winner &
Irrelevant

Score &
Relevant

Odds

55.5%c

54.8%d

79.3%a

75.8%b

Records

73.0%c

73.4%c

81.6%a

77.4%b

Accuracy

51.1%

51.1%

55.5%

55.1%

Note. Each row shows the percentage of making wise predictions made in each condition across all games
in all experiments. To account for both observed and unobserved differences between games, the means for
each condition are mean-centered by game and added to the overall average across all games and
conditions. “Odds” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team favored by betting markets,
“Records” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that had won a greater percentage of
games, and “Accuracy” indicates wise predictions defined as choosing the team that actually won the game.
Within each row, means with different subscripts differ at p < .05 using within-subjects pairwise t-tests and
the Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Holm, 1979).
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